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The Problematic Use of the Kill  
Zone Theory 
Kaitlin R. O’Donnell* 
The kill zone theory is a legal doctrine that does not exist in statute but has been used 
in jury instructions to aid in securing convictions for attempted murder charges. As a result of 
the kill zone theory, individuals in California have received lengthier sentences and, in some 
cases, have been convicted of crimes that fail to meet the requisite specific intent for attempted 
murder cases. The kill zone theory has no purpose in California law but to make the path to 
conviction easier and to put defendants in jail for longer. The kill zone theory is an unnecessary 
tool because there are several alternatives that would serve the same purpose of ensuring 
individuals do not evade punishment for endangering the lives of others. This Note will discuss 
the kill zone theory and how it came to be, explain the problematic aspects of the doctrine 
that end up harming defendants, propose alternative solutions to the kill zone theory, and 
conclude that the kill zone theory should no longer be used in California. 
  
 
* I would like to thank Professor Jonathan Glater, whose guidance, patience, and expertise were 
instrumental in writing this Note. I would also like to thank Annee Della Donna and Innocence Rights 
of Orange County. Working with Ms. Della Donna and Innocence Rights of Orange County on 
Rayford and Glass’s habeas petitions introduced me to the kill zone theory and how problematic it truly 
is. Finally, I would like to thank the UC Irvine Law Review, particularly Catherine Rosoff and Jordan 
Lowery, for their help in preparing this Note for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION  
On January 2, 2004, two teenagers named Dupree Glass and Juan Rayford 
went to a party where Glass got into an argument with another boy named Perry.1 
Perry then left the party with his cousins, Donisha and Shadonna Williams.2 Still 
upset about the argument, Glass texted Donisha asking where Perry was, expressing 
that he wanted to fight Perry.3 Donisha repeatedly told Glass that Perry was at their 
grandmother’s house and eventually told Glass he could come to the house to see 
for himself that Perry was not there.4 Glass and Rayford then drove to the Lair 
house, where Donisha, Shadonna, and their mother, Sheila Lair, lived to see if Perry 
was there.5  
When Glass and Rayford arrived, Glass asked Donisha to tell Perry “to come 
outside and catch a fade” (meaning come outside and fight).6 Sheila walked outside 
to find that a crowd had gathered on her lawn to witness the anticipated fight 
between Glass and Perry.7 Sheila told Glass that Perry was not there and that there 
would be no fighting at the house.8 As she was talking to Glass, two men began to 
fight Sheila’s neighbor, Terry.9 Soon after, eight shots were fired.10 No one was 
killed or seriously injured; two people were grazed by bullets and treated with  
Band-Aids at the scene.11  
According to Sheila’s and Donisha’s trial testimonies, Glass and Rayford were 
both shooters.12 Sheila testified that someone called “Fat Man” fired the first 
gunshots, and then she saw Glass start shooting at the house.13 She also “saw a flash 
and heard sounds coming from the area where Rayford was standing” and assumed 
that he too fired shots at the house.14 Donisha testified that she saw Rayford fire 
the first shot straight up into the air, Fat Man shoot several times toward the front 
door, and Glass shoot at the front window of the house.15  
At trial, the jury found that Glass and Rayford were guilty despite the lack of 
a primary target, the absence of evidence of the requisite specific intent to kill, and 
the fact that Sheila’s and Donisha’s testimonies were the only things connecting 
 










10. Id. at *2–3. 
11. Id. at *3. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at *2. 
14. Id.  
15. Id. at *3. 
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Glass and Rayford to the shootings.16 Glass and Rayford were convicted of one 
count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling and eleven counts of attempted murder; 
each received eleven consecutive life sentences.17 Glass and Rayford have 
maintained their innocence since the beginning of the case. After sixteen years in 
prison, Glass’s and Rayford’s writs of habeas corpus were granted.18  
The prosecutor’s use of the kill zone theory was the driving force that led to 
Glass’s and Rayford’s convictions. The idea behind the kill zone theory is that “the 
intent required for attempted murder can be satisfied not only by the intent to kill 
a particular person, but also by ‘a generalized intent to kill someone.’”19 In order for 
the kill zone theory to apply, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that (1) “the perpetrator intended to create a zone of fatal harm around the primary 
target; that is, an area in which the perpetrator intended to kill everyone present to 
ensure the primary target’s death,” and (2) the alleged attempted murder victims 
were not the primary target and were located within the zone of fatal harm.20 The 
perpetrator must have the specific intent and the means sufficient to kill the primary 
target and all others in the zone of fatal harm.21 The fact that a person desired to 
kill a particular target does not preclude a finding that the person also, concurrently, 
intended to kill others within the kill zone.22 As such, a defendant would be guilty 
of the attempted murder of victims who are not the defendant’s primary targets if 
the defendant specifically intends that everyone in the kill zone die;23 victims can 
include those not seen by the defendant.24  
The kill zone theory “is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury 
instructions. . . . Rather, it is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a 
given case: a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent 
intent to kill others.”25 The kill zone theory exists in jury instructions26 which have 
been heavily shaped by case law. The kill zone theory blurs the line between express 
and implied malice,27 both making it easier for prosecutors to convince juries that 
 
16. In re Rayford (Rayford II), 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 423–25 (Ct. App. 2020). 
17. There were also gang enhancements on the eleven consecutive life sentences, but they were 
overturned in 2006 while this case was being heard on appeal. Evidence was insufficient to prove that 
Glass and Rayford belonged to a gang. Rayford I, 2006 WL 1990962, at *1. 
18. Rayford II, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 405. 
19. People v. Ervine, 220 P.3d 820, 856 (Cal. 2009) (quoting People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272, 275 
(Cal. 2009)). 
20. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 8.66.1 (2020) [hereinafter CALJIC] 
(emphasis added). 
21. See id. 
22. See People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1118 (Cal. 2002). 
23. People v. McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 910 (Ct. App. 2012). 
24. People v. Windfield, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 708 (Ct. App.), review pending, 337 P.3d 494  
(Cal. 2014). 
25. Bland, 48 P.3d at 1119 n.6. 
26. The kill zone jury instructions include JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 600 (2020) [hereinafter CALCRIM] and CALJIC 8.66.1. 
27. Express malice requires a showing that the assailant either desires that death occur or knows, 
to a substantial certainty, that death will occur. 17A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Crimes Against the 
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there is specific intent when there really may be none and giving prosecutors the 
ability to more easily secure convictions.28  
In the Supreme Court of California’s most recent kill zone case, People v. 
Canizales, the court acknowledged the danger in using the kill zone theory and noted 
“trial courts must exercise caution when determining whether to permit the jury to 
rely upon the kill zone theory.”29 This Note will discuss why exercising caution is 
not enough and will argue that the kill zone theory should no longer be used  
in California. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of the kill zone theory and how 
it evolved into the doctrine we see today. Part I will demonstrate how the kill zone 
theory was created to be a gap filler for attempted murder charges not covered by 
transferred or conditional intent and has spiraled into a tool with few limitations 
and ample opportunity for prosecutorial misuse. 
Part II of this Note will analyze the problematic use of the kill zone theory. 
Section II.A will discuss other literature that has been written on the kill zone theory, 
almost all of which praises the use of the kill zone theory rather than criticizing it. 
Section II.B will discuss the lack of limitations on the kill zone theory. Section II.C 
will discuss the redundancy of the kill zone theory, showing how other doctrines 
could be used to accomplish what the kill zone theory sets out to accomplish. 
Section II.D will discuss the risk of prosecutorial overreach enabled by the kill  
zone theory.  
Part III will suggest alternatives to the kill zone theory that ensure defendants 
both do not escape punishment and are not subjected to unjustifiably long prison 
sentences. This Part will also apply the proposed solutions to the cases discussed in 
this Note to demonstrate their efficacy.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The kill zone theory is a complex doctrine that California courts have been 
shaping since 2002. That year, the kill zone theory was first introduced in dictum in 
People v. Bland and has since been used to hold defendants responsible for attempted 
murder charges, resulting in lengthy sentences.30 This Part will articulate the 
doctrine that preceded the kill zone theory, how the kill zone theory began, and how 
it developed to what it is today. 
 
Person § 33 (2020); People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 734–35 (Cal. 2005). Malice is implied when “a killing 
results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the 
act is deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human 
life.” 17A CAL. JUR. 3D, supra, § 34; Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(applying California law), cert. denied sub nom. Roberts v. Torres, 556 U.S. 1183 (2009); People v. Cook, 
139 P.3d 492, 515 (Cal. 2006). 
28. See infra Section II.D. 
29. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 698 (Cal. 2019).  
30. 48 P.3d at 1117–19. 
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In order to fully understand the kill zone theory and its proper application, it 
is necessary to examine the elements of attempt law and the doctrines courts use to 
ensure defendants are adequately punished for murder and attempted murder. 
Attempted murder is distinct from murder in that it is only a specific intent crime; 
as such, a defendant cannot be guilty due to recklessness. The key to proving 
attempted murder is proving there was specific intent to kill. Because of the specific 
intent requirement, courts have to be a bit creative in finding ways to hold 
defendants responsible for attempted murder in certain scenarios. The kill zone 
theory is one of those creative solutions. As this discussion will show, the kill zone 
theory is meant to fill the gap between the doctrines of conditional intent and 
transferred intent to ensure that no one is able to escape punishment for  
attempted murder. 
A. Attempt Law 
The kill zone theory can only be applied to attempted murder crimes.31 An 
attempt to commit a crime consists of a specific intent to commit the crime and a 
direct but ineffectual act done toward the commission of said crime.32 As such, an 
attempt crime involves a mens rea and an actus reus requirement.33 Proving attempt 
requires demonstrating the defendant’s action was more than mere preparation and 
that the defendant acted with the impression that the crime would be successfully 
completed.34 The specific intent required by attempt law does not require a showing 
that the intended act would be effective in completing the target crime but does 
require that the defendant intended to commit the target crime, even if that crime 
does not itself require specific intent.35 The specific intent required for the 
attempted crime must have been actual, not merely presumed.36 The jury should 
not convict the defendant of an attempted crime in the absence of specific intent.37 
In California, specific intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence.38 
Before relying on circumstantial evidence to conclude the defendant had the 
specific intent necessary to be found guilty, the prosecution must convince the jury 
that it “[has] proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable 
 
31. If a victim other than the defendant’s primary target is actually killed, then the doctrine of 
transferred intent would be applied, not the kill zone theory. See id. at 1117. 
32. People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 248 (Cal. 1974). 
33. People v. Johnson, 303 P.3d 379, 384 (Cal. 2013). 
34. People v. Carrington, 211 P.3d 617, 656 (Cal. 2009), cert denied sub nom. Carrington  
v. California, 559 U.S. 1094 (2010); People v. Medelez, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 404–05 (Ct. App. 2016). 
35. 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Miscellaneous Offenses § 19 (2020) (first citing People  
v. Chandler, 332 P.3d 538, 543 (Cal. 2014); then citing People v. Beck, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 230  
(Ct. App. 2005)). 
36. See People v. Fulton, 10 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (Ct. App. 1961) (using defendant’s statements 
about getting money out of the bank to prove actual specific intent); People v. Franquelin, 241 P.2d 
651, 655 (Cal. 1952) (“[M]ere preparation is not sufficient to constitute an ‘attempt.’”). 
37. See People v. Collie, 634 P.2d 534, 534 (Cal. 1981). 
38. People v. Neal, 218 P.2d 556, 559 (Cal. 1950). 
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doubt.”39 The jury must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion 
supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required 
intent to commit the attempted crime.40  
B. Proving Attempted Murder 
In an attempted murder case, the prosecution must prove that (1) “a direct but 
ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another human being,” and 
(2) the person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a 
specific intent to kill.41 Express malice is “the deliberate intention to kill another 
person.”42 The acts of a person who intends to kill another must indicate a certain, 
unambiguous attempt to kill their target.43 Put simply, attempted murder requires a 
specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward 
accomplishing the intended killing.44 
Express malice is required to support an attempted murder charge; implied 
malice is insufficient.45 Implied malice is “the state of mind that exists when a 
person deliberately performs an act, the natural consequences of which are 
dangerous to life, with knowledge that his or her conduct endangers the life of 
another and with ‘conscious disregard’ for life.”46 Because implied malice cannot 
support an attempted murder charge, it is impossible for a defendant to be 
convicted of attempted murder under a theory of wanton recklessness.47 
A single act can produce more than one count of attempted murder, but 
specific intent still must be judged separately as to each alleged victim, regardless of 
whether that victim was targeted or randomly chosen.48 Ordinarily, a single act of 
shooting at a group would not support multiple counts of attempted murder.49 
However, courts have conjured up ways to ensure defendants do not evade 
responsibility for endangering the lives of others in such scenarios.50  
 
39. CALCRIM, supra note 26, § 225. 
40. Id. 
41. People v. Lee, 74 P.3d 176, 179 (Cal. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Xiong v. California, 541  
U.S. 947 (2004). 
42. LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, THE RUTTER GRP., CALIFORNIA 
CRIMINAL LAW § 5:8 (2019–2020 ed. 2019) (citing In re Thomas C., 228 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436  
(Ct. App. 1986)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 2019); CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.11. 
43. See CALCRIM, supra note 26, § 600. 
44. People v. Cardona, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 194 (Ct. App. 2016). 
45. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1117 (Cal. 2002).  
46. LEVENSON & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 42. 
47. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 42 (2020) (discussing how “depraved-heart” second-degree 
murder requires “the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with reckless and wanton 
unconcern and indifference as to whether anyone is harmed or not,” but without the intent for death 
to occur as a result of that indifference). 
48. See, e.g., People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272, 278–79 (Cal. 2009); People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 
732 (Cal. 2005). 
49. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 864 (Ct. App. 2012). 
50. See infra Sections I.C.1, I.C.4.a, I.C.3.a. 
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The only way these single acts of shooting could theoretically constitute 
attempted murder is under a theory of conditional, transferred, or concurrent intent. 
Under the doctrine of conditional intent, the defendant has a deliberate plan to kill 
someone, if necessary, in the course of committing a crime. Under the doctrine of 
transferred intent, the specific intent to murder one person is transferred to the 
person who is killed. Transferred intent has been found inapplicable to attempted 
murder, but it is from transferred intent that concurrent intent was developed.51 
Under the doctrine of concurrent intent, one can specifically intend to kill one 
person and at the same time have specific intent to kill others nearby. Concurrent 
intent is the theory of intent captured by the kill zone theory.  
Courts developed these doctrines to find ways to hold defendants responsible 
for their crimes—particularly murder and attempted murder—in order to ensure 
defendants do not escape punishment for crimes the courts consider reprehensible. 
The creation of these doctrines and the various ways they have been applied in 
pursuit of policy objectives and enhanced punishment has resulted in a blurred and 
malleable definition of specific intent. 
1. Conditional Intent 
According to the doctrine of conditional intent, “death is more than merely 
foreseeable: it is ‘fully contemplated and planned for’ and is part of a ‘willful and 
deliberate plan.’”52 Conditional intent is most often used to satisfy the specific intent 
requirement in carjacking cases.53 The intent requirement of the federal carjacking 
statute is that “at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the 
driver’s vehicle, the defendant possessed the conditional intent to seriously harm or 
kill the driver if necessary to steal the car, or the unconditional intent to harm or kill 
in all events.”54  
In Holloway v. United States, Holloway was charged with carjacking.55 At trial, 
his accomplice testified that although he and Holloway planned to steal cars without 
harming drivers, they would have used their guns if the victims gave them a hard 
time.56 Section 2119 of the U.S. Code defines carjacking as taking or attempting to 
take “a motor vehicle . . . from . . . another by force and violence or by 
intimidation” “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.”57 The 
Supreme Court held “proof of an intent to kill or harm if necessary to effect a 
carjacking” fulfills the mens rea component of the federal carjacking statute.58 
 
51. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1119 (Cal. 2002). 
52. The Supreme Court, 1998 Term–Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 326, 380 (1999). 
53. Id. at 383. 
54. LEVENSON & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 42, § 6:105; accord Holloway v. United States, 526 
U.S. 1, 12 (1999). 
55. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 1. 
56. Id. 
57. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West 1996), quoted in Holloway, 526 U.S. at 1. 
58. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 1–2. 
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Conditional intent language could be applied to attempted murder cases and 
may refine and clarify proper use of the kill zone theory. In such a scenario, the 
defendant would contemplate and plan for the fact that people near their intended 
target could be killed in order to facilitate the killing of the intended target. For 
example, if the defendant were to throw a grenade at a group of people to kill his 
target, the defendant would recognize that the death of those around his target was 
more than merely foreseeable. The use of such a weapon would indicate a clear 
intent to kill both the target and anyone who was in close proximity to him at  
the time. 
Conditional intent as applied to the federal carjacking statute in Holloway is 
used to prove the mens rea of this specific statute. Conditional intent has yet to be 
used to hold defendants responsible for charges other than federal carjacking. The 
kill zone theory could be seen as filling a gap left by conditional intent because 
conditional intent does not allow for the punishment deemed necessary by the court 
for these attempted murder crimes. But as evidenced by the grenade example, the 
language of conditional intent could apply to kill zone cases.  
2. Transferred Intent 
The doctrine of transferred intent applies when a defendant intends to kill one 
person but mistakenly kills another.59 “When one intends to kill and does so, the 
killing is hardly an accident, even if the specific victim or victims are unintended.”60 
The policy justification for transferred intent is “that a defendant who shoots at an 
intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be 
subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his 
intended mark.”61 As such, transferred intent applies only to murder and not to 
attempted murder.62 Improperly applying the transferred intent doctrine can result 
in disproportionate punishment.63 To avoid impermissibly harsh punishment, 
“where a single act is alleged to be an attempt on two persons’ lives, the intent to 
kill should be evaluated independently as to each victim, and the jury should not be 
instructed to transfer intent from one to another.”64 
The fact that transferred intent cannot apply to attempted murder worried 
courts that individuals who intended to kill someone in a group but failed at their 
objective could not be guilty for the attempted murder of all the people in the group. 
The courts expressed an underlying fear that someone with bad aim would be 
rewarded with an attempted murder charge simply because that person missed their 
 
59. CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.65. 
60. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1113 (Cal. 2002). 
61. People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 292 (Cal. 1996). 
62. Bland, 48 P.3d at 1117. 
63. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 127 (6th ed. 2012). 
64. People v. Calderon, 283 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting People v. Czahara, 250 
Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
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intended target.65 To ensure that defendants would not benefit for their inability to 
complete their intended crimes, courts adopted the theory of concurrent intent. 
3. Concurrent Intent: Kill Zone Theory 
Concurrent intent applies when “a defendant intends to kill a particular target, 
and uses a mode of attack that, by its nature and scope, shows a concurrent intent 
to kill persons in the vicinity of the intended target.”66 The person’s desire to “kill a 
particular target does not preclude a finding that the person, also, concurrently 
intended to kill others within the kill zone.”67 For example, if the defendant targeted 
a specific person by firing a flurry of bullets into a crowd, the defendant “may be 
convicted of attempted murder if the evidence shows they intended to kill everyone 
in the victim’s vicinity in order to kill the intended victim.”68 Concurrent intent 
enables the use of the kill zone theory.  
C. Development of Kill Zone Doctrine 
Understanding how the kill zone theory functions in California courts requires 
an examination of its doctrinal history. The kill zone theory was first introduced in 
People v. Bland and has changed and developed with each subsequent case. This 
doctrinal history has heavily influenced California Jury Instructions—Criminal 
(CALJIC) 8.66.1 and matters greatly as to how juries understand when and how the 
kill zone theory should be applied. 
1. The Beginning of the Kill Zone Theory in California: People v. Bland 
The kill zone theory, as applied in California, was first mentioned as dictum 
in Bland, a transferred intent case. Jomo Bland, a member of the Insane Crips gang, 
was convicted of the first-degree murder of Kenneth Wilson, a member of the 
Rolling 20s Crips, and the premeditated attempted murders of Skylar Morgan and 
Leon Simon.69 Intending to kill Wilson, Bland shot into the car that the three people 
were in.70 Wilson tried to drive away as Bland continued to fire at the car, but 
eventually crashed into a pole.71 Wilson died of a gunshot wound to the chest, 
Simon was shot in the liver, and Morgan was shot in the shoulder.72 The Bland court 
addressed two issues in its decision: (1) whether an intent to kill transfers to an 
 
65. This holding is the reason the kill zone theory was developed. See Bland, 48 P.3d at 1119. 
66. 17A CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 27, § 30. 
67. People v. Bragg, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Bland, 48 P.3d at 1118). 
68. People v. Falaniko, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 632 (Ct. App. 2016), modified, People v. Canizales, 
442 P.3d 686 (Cal. 2019); see also 17A CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 27, § 30.  
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unintended victim when the intended target is killed, and (2) whether transferred 
intent applies to attempted murder.73  
In addressing whether an intent to kill transfers to an unintended victim when 
the intended target is killed, Bland rejected the reasoning of People v. Birreuta, which 
held that when the intended victim is killed, there is no need for the doctrine of 
transferred intent because the purpose of the transferred intent doctrine is to 
“insure the adequate punishment of those who accidentally kill innocent 
bystanders” and fail to kill their intended victims.74 The Bland court rejected this 
idea, stating “[i]t may not be necessary to find that intent to kill extends to all persons 
actually killed, but we believe it is appropriate to do so.”75 The court ultimately held 
“[i]ntent to kill transfers to an unintended homicide victim even if the intended 
target is killed,” most likely to ensure the defendant is adequately punished for 
taking the equally valuable lives of the intended victim and accidental victim.76 
In its discussion on whether transferred intent applies to attempted murder, 
the Bland court cited several cases which held that transferred intent does not apply 
to attempted murder.77 Accordingly, the Bland court held that “acts with the intent 
to kill one person constitute murder of anyone actually killed, but not attempted 
murder of others.”78 The court distinguished between completed murder and 
attempted murder regarding transferred intent: 
Someone who in truth does not intend to kill a person is not guilty of that 
person’s attempted murder even if the crime would have been  
murder—due to transferred intent—if the person were killed. To be guilty 
of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not 
someone else. The defendant’s mental state must be examined as to each alleged 
attempted murder victim. Someone who intends to kill only one person and 
attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the 
intended victim, but not of others.79 
The court then resurrected the concerns discussed in Ford v. State, a case 
decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals, to find a way to hold Bland guilty of 
attempted murder: 
Assuming an attempted murder scenario where the defendant fires a shot 
at an intended victim and no bystanders are physically injured, one sees 
that it is virtually impossible to decide to whom the defendant’s intent 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1112 (quoting People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled by 
People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998)). 
75. Id. at 1113. 
76. Id. at 1115. 
77. Id. at 1116 (first citing People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 837 (Ct. App. 1988); then 
citing People v. Calderon, 283 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1991); and then citing People v. Chinchilla, 
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 764 (Ct. App. 1997); and then citing People v. Flores, 223 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468–69 
(1986); and then citing People v. Neal, 218 P.2d 556, 559 (Cal. 1950)). 
78. Id. at 1118. 
79. Id. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
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should be transferred. Is the intent to murder transferred to everyone in 
proximity to the path of the bullet? Is the intent transferred to everyone 
frightened and thereby assaulted by the shot? There is no rational method 
for deciding how the defendant’s intent to murder should be transferred.80 
The court was concerned that defendants who shot at an intended victim may 
evade punishment for endangering the lives of individuals nearby and sought a way 
for the intent to kill one person to be transferred to bystanders who theoretically 
could have also been killed.  
In Ford, the defendant hurled large landscaping rocks at vehicles traveling 
along the Capital Beltway and, in the process, injured several people and damaged 
many vehicles.81 The defendant was convicted of eight counts of assault with intent 
to murder, among other charges.82 Drawing from California case law to support its 
conclusion, the Ford court determined transferred intent cannot apply to attempted 
murder.83 The Maryland court held that in a case of transferred intent, the intended 
harm does not occur to the intended victim but rather to a second unintended 
victim; as such, the actual result is an unintended, unanticipated consequence of 
intended harm.84  
In dictum, the Ford court then goes on to explain how the ideas behind 
transferred intent could apply to attempted murder cases: 
For example, consider a defendant who shoots a single bullet at the head 
of A, standing with B and C. If the defendant misses A and instead kills B, 
the defendant’s intent to murder A will be transferred to allow his 
conviction for B’s murder. The intent is concurrent, on the other hand, when the 
nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we 
can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by 
harming everyone in that victim’s vicinity. For example, an assailant who places 
a bomb on a commercial airplane intending to harm a primary target on 
board ensures by this method of attack that all passengers will be killed. 
Similarly, consider a defendant who intends to kill A and, in order to ensure 
A’s death, drives by a group consisting of A, B, and C, andattacks the 
group with automatic weapon fire or an explosive device 
devastating enough to kill everyone in the group. The defendant has 
intentionally created a “kill zone” to ensure the death of his primary victim, and 
the trier of fact may reasonably infer from the method employed an intent to kill 
others concurrent with the intent to kill the primary victim.When the defendant 
escalated his mode of attack from a single bullet aimed at A’s head to a hail 
of bullets or an explosive device, the factfinder can infer that, whether or 
not the defendant succeeded in killing A, the defendant concurrently 
 
80. Id. (citing Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 1000 (Md. 1993), overruled in part by Henry v. State, 
19 A.3d 944 (Md. 2011)). 
81. Ford, 625 A.2d at 987. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 999–1000 (relying on People v. Calderon, 283 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836–37 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
84. Id. at 1000. 
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intended to kill everyone in A’s immediate vicinity to ensure A’s death. The 
defendant’s intent need not be transferred from A to B, because although 
the defendant’s goal was to kill A, his intent to kill B was also direct; it was 
concurrent with his intent to kill A. Where the means employed to commit the 
crime against a primary victim creates a zone of harm around that victim, the 
factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are 
in the anticipated zone. This situation is distinct from the “depraved heart” 
situation because the trier of fact may infer the actual intent to kill which is lacking 
in a “depraved heart” scenario.85
This discussion in Ford is the basis for the kill zone theory as it continues to 
exist in California. Although all of the discussion of the kill zone theory in Bland 
and Ford was dicta, the court wanted to ensure there was some kind of protocol for 
situations like the bomb-on-a-plane example. Like Ford, Bland carved out doctrine 
to hold defendants guilty for attempted murder in cases where the court would have 
applied transferred intent had someone died. 
The Bland court wanted to decide how to deal with the type of case left 
unaddressed by transferred intent to ensure that no defendant escapes punishment 
for firing into a crowd of people. Bland relied on Ford’s reasoning that concurrent 
intent can be used to fill the gap left by transferred intent: “[A]lthough the intent to 
kill a primary target does not transfer to a survivor, the fact the person desires to kill 
a particular target does not preclude finding that the person also, concurrently, 
intended to kill others within what it termed the ‘kill zone.’”86 The Bland court 
concluded that a person who shoots at a group of people may be punished for the 
actions towards everyone in that group even if the shooter primarily targeted only 
one of them.87 
To support its decision to affirm the attempted murder convictions, the Bland 
court held that use of CALJIC 8.65, the transferred intent instruction, was not a 
prejudicial error because the jury likely understood that the transferred intent to kill 
could not apply if the person was merely injured.88 Furthermore, the court found 
that “even if [the] defendant primarily wanted to kill Wilson, he also, concurrently, 
intended to kill the others in the car. At the least, he intended to create a kill zone.”89 
The purpose of Bland was to decide whether transferred intent can apply to 
attempted murder, which the court held is impossible, and the discussion of the kill 
zone theory was a venture into the land of “what if.”90 The court made it clear that 
it does not want people who are lousy shots to get away with endangering others. 
Essentially, the court sought to hold people accountable for wanton recklessness 
 
85. Id. at 1000–01 (emphasis added). 
86. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1118 (Cal. 2002). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 1120–21. 
89. Id. 
90. See id. at 1119. 
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although the attempted murder doctrine expressly forbade courts from doing so.91 
By using the kill zone theory, the court extended the idea of express malice to 
include implied malice. 
Courts have demonstrated confusion about how exactly the kill zone theory 
applies. As a result, there has been significant change to the language of the kill zone 
jury instruction over the years. Case law after Bland demonstrates the ease with 
which prosecutors are able to apply the kill zone theory to the facts of their cases 
to secure longer sentences for defendants.92  
2. The Jury Instructions 
Since Bland’s official adoption of the kill zone theory into California law, the 
doctrine has been interpreted in several ways. The way case law has shaped the 
doctrine is reflected well in the language of the jury instructions. Because the kill 
zone jury instruction is all the jury gets to see, understanding the jury instruction is 
key to understanding the application of kill zone theory as a whole. 
In 2003, the first official kill zone jury instruction, CALJIC 8.66.1,  
was released:93 
  A person who primarily intends to kill one person, may also 
concurrently intend to kill other persons within a particular zone of risk. 
This zone of risk is termed the “kill zone.” The intent is concurrent when 
the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are 
such that it is reasonable to infer the perpetrator intended to ensure harm 
to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim’s vicinity. 
  Whether a perpetrator actually intended to kill the victim, either as a 
primary target or as someone within a “kill zone” is an issue to be decided 
by you.94 
 
91. 40 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 47; see also Bland, 48 P.3d at 1117 (“But over a century ago, we 
made clear that implied malice cannot support a conviction of an attempt to commit murder.”). 
92. Bland also asserts that prior cases, including People v. Vang, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704  
(Ct. App. 2001), contained holdings which exhibited the kill zone theory described in Ford without 
actually using kill zone terminology. In Vang, there were two separate gang-related drive-by shootings 
committed within minutes of each other in which the defendants aimed at houses, killed a  
three-year-old child, and wounded three others. Id. at 706–07. Defendants were convicted of eleven 
counts of attempted murder. Id. at 710. Based on circumstantial evidence, the court in Vang found that 
the jury drew a reasonable inference in finding “that defendants harbored a specific intent to kill every 
living being within the residences they shot up.” Id. at 710–11 (noting that the jury specifically examined 
the placement of shots, the number of shots, and the use of “high-powered, wall-piercing weapons”). 
The court held the express malice requirement was met “even though defendants could not see all their 
victims during the shooting rampage.” Id. at 705. 
93. The California Judicial Council Criminal Jury Instructions Advisory Committee “[r]egularly 
reviews case law and statutes affecting jury instructions and makes recommendations to the council for 
updating, amending, and adding topics to the council’s criminal jury instructions.” Criminal Jury 
Instructions Resource Center, CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/312.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BAU4-WZ6S] ( last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
94. CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.66.1 (2003). 
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When comparing the language of the 2003 CALJIC kill zone jury instruction 
with the 2019 version, it is clear just how much the doctrine has changed.  
Present-day guidance on how to use the kill zone theory lies in CALJIC 8.66.1, 
which states: 
  A person who primarily intends to kill one person, or persons, known 
as the primary target[s], may at the same time attempt to kill [all] [people] 
[persons] in the immediate vicinity of the primary target[s]. This area is 
known as the [“zone of fatal harm.”] [“kill zone.”] A [zone of fatal harm] 
[kill zone] is created when a perpetrator specifically intending to kill the 
primary target by lethal means also attempts to kill [everyone] present in 
the [zone of fatal harm.] [kill zone.] If the perpetrator has this specific 
intent, and employs the means sufficient to kill the primary target[s] and 
all others in the [sic] [zone of fatal harm] [kill zone], the perpetrator is guilty 
of the crime[s] of attempted murder of the [other person[s]] [anyone] in 
the [zone of fatal harm] [kill zone]. 
  In determining a perpetrator’s intent to create a [zone of fatal harm] 
[kill zone] and the scope of any such zone, the jury should consider the 
circumstances of the offense, such as the type of weapon used, [the 
number of shots fired,] the distance between the perpetrator and the 
alleged victim[s], and the proximity of the alleged victim[s] to the primary 
target[s]. [Evidence that a perpetrator who intends to kill a primary target 
acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury or death 
for those around a primary target does not satisfy this theory of liability.] 
  In order for the [zone of fatal harm][kill zone] to apply the evidence 
must show: 
1. The perpetrator intended to create a [zone of fatal harm] [kill zone] 
around the primary target; that is, an area in which the perpetrator 
intended to kill everyone present to ensure the primary target’s death, 
and 
2. The alleged attempted murder victim[s] who [was] [were] not the 
primary target[s] [was] [were] located within the [zone of fatal harm.] 
[kill zone.] 
  Whether a perpetrator actually intended to kill the victim, either as a 
primary target or as someone within a [zone of fatal harm] [kill zone] is an 
issue to be decided by you.95 
In 2006, California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM)96 released its own 
version of the kill zone jury instruction:  
 
95. Id. § 8.66.1 (2019) (brackets in original). Interestingly, there is a use note which states “‘Zone 
of fatal harm’ and ‘kill zone’ have been bracketed in the instruction. The court should decide what 
phrase to use.” Id. Jurors could find that these two phrases have very different connotations and 
definitions, adding to the potential for confusion or misapplication of the jury instruction. 
96. The Judicial Council adopted the CALCRIM jury instructions on August 26, 2005, effective 
January 1, 2006. Any kill zone case prior to January 1, 2006 would have used CALJIC § 8.66.1. Criminal 
Jury Instructions Resource Center, supra note 93. 
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  A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at the same 
time intend to kill anyone in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’ In 
order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of ____ <insert 
name of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, 
the People must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill ____ 
<insert name of primary target alleged> but also either intended to kill ____ 
<insert name of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent 
theory>, or intended to kill anyone within the kill zone. 
  If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill 
____ <insert name of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent 
theory> or intended to kill ____ <insert name of primary target alleged> by 
harming everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of the attempted murder of ____ <insert name of victim charged in 
attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>.97 
Since 2006, the language of the CALCRIM 600 jury instruction has not 
changed despite the fact that the doctrine has evolved significantly. CALCRIM jury 
instructions are more frequently used because they are widely believed to be easier 
for jurors to understand.98 While avoiding juror confusion is important, the 
language of the jury instruction should at least evolve for clarity as CALJIC  
8.66.1 has.  
Many of the cases mentioned in this Note used the CALCRIM 600 jury 
instruction, including Stone, Campos, Adams, and Canizales. Several others did  
not: McCloud and Rayford both used CALJIC 8.66.1, and Smith, Perez, Bland, Ford, 
and Warner used neither instruction. Regardless, all of these cases shaped CALJIC 
8.66.1, which provides the most detailed evidence about how the kill zone jury 
doctrine has evolved. Because CALJIC 8.66.1 actually reflects the doctrine created 
by case law, this Note will focus its analysis on the kill zone theory through the lens 
of CALJIC 8.66.1 rather than CALCRIM 600. 
Although CALJIC 8.66.1 tries to provide more safeguards than CALCRIM 
600 based on the evolution of the doctrine, it cannot correct the defects of the vague 
language of kill zone jury instructions. CALCRIM 600 and CALJIC 8.66.1 suffer 
the same defects and negatively impact defendants, and neither should continue to 
be used in California courts. 
The kill zone theory has been altered and extended to fit changing 
circumstances and apply to as many cases as possible. The cases mentioned in this 
Part will demonstrate how both prosecutors and courts have shaped the kill zone 
jury instruction, most notably (1) when a single shot is fired at a group, (2) when 
 
97. CALCRIM, supra note 26, § 600 (2006). 
98. A study showed that CALCRIM instructions made it easier for jurors to understand 
reasonable doubt and evidence, but also that there were no significant differences found for juror 
understanding of intent or murder aforethought between the CALCRIM and CALJIC jury instructions. 
See John Coleman, Russ K.E. Espinoza & Jennifer V. Coons, An Empirical Comparison of the Old and 
Revised Jury Instructions of California: Do Jurors Comprehend Legal Ease Better or Does Bias Still Exist?, 
OPEN ACCESS LIBR. J., Feb. 17, 2017, at 1, 11. 
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determining the primary target, (3) by blurring the line between express and implied 
malice, and (4) when analyzing circumstantial evidence.99  
3. Key Cases: Single Shot Fired 
Several cases have expanded upon the kill zone theory and how concurrent 
intent could exist for attempted murder by allowing the theory to apply in cases 
where a single shot was fired at a group of people. In these cases, courts have upheld 
convictions for multiple counts of attempted murder under the idea that the single 
bullet theoretically could have hit more than one person. 
a. People v. Smith 
In Smith, the defendant fired a single shot at a moving car, whose passengers 
included a woman (Karen), a man, and a baby.100 Based on the conversation that 
took place between Smith and Karen eight to nine months before the shooting, 
Karen was the intended victim.101 Nobody in the car was seriously injured in the 
incident.102 Smith was charged and convicted of the attempted murder of Karen 
and her baby.103 The Smith court held evidence that Smith purposefully discharged 
a firearm at the individuals seated in the car, one behind the other, supported the 
inference that he intended to kill both Karen and her baby.104  
The court stated that the kill zone theory “does not preclude a conclusion that 
defendant’s act of firing a single bullet . . . can support two convictions of 
attempted murder under the totality of the circumstances shown by the 
evidence.”105 The court also concluded that attempted murder convictions could be 
sustained without reference to the kill zone theory in jury instructions.106 The court 
held there was sufficient evidence of intent to kill the baby and affirmed both 
attempted murder convictions.  
Judge Werdegar’s dissent in Smith broke down the kill zone analysis into a  
two-factor test: 
A kill zone, or concurrent intent, analysis . . . focuses on (1) whether the 
fact finder can rationally infer from the type and extent of force employed 
in the defendant’s attack on the primary target that the defendant 
intentionally created a zone of fatal harm, and (2) whether the nontargeted 
alleged attempted murder victim inhabited that zone of harm.107 
 
99. See infra Sections I.C.3, I.C.4, I.C.5, I.C.6.  
100. People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 733 (Cal. 2005). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 733–34 (listing some of the charges and convictions, although not all are listed  
in text). 
104. Id. at 737–38. 
105. Id. at 739. 
106. See id. 
107. Id. at 746 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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The dissent accused the majority of having lost sight of “the crucial difference 
between implied malice . . . and express malice” in its struggle to articulate grounds 
for upholding the attempted murder conviction for the baby.108 According to Judge 
Werdegar, there was ample evidence that Smith acted with conscious disregard for 
the baby’s life, but the evidence was insufficient “to permit the jury to infer beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to kill the baby, with whom . . . defendant 
had no quarrel at all.”109 In doing so, the majority permitted “knowing 
endangerment, which establishes at most implied malice, to serve, by itself, as proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of intent to kill.”110 Judge Werdegar warned that the kill 
zone theory could result in the “absurd conclusion that an assailant has tried to 
murder everyone his act endangers.”111 Importantly, the dissent noted that “the 
majority’s expansion of attempted murder liability to cover mere endangerment is 
unnecessary in order to ensure assailants are appropriately punished for acts that 
place victims’ lives in danger.”112 As this Note will discuss, the legislature created 
several other charges to ensure defendants would be appropriately punished  
for endangerment.113 
b. People v. Perez 
In Perez, the defendant fired a single bullet from a car at a group of seven 
peace officers and a civilian.114 One of the officers was injured, but no one died.115 
The defendant was convicted of seven counts of premeditated attempted murder 
of a peace officer and one count of premeditated attempted murder for the 
civilian.116 The court attempted to clarify Bland:  
Bland simply recognizes that a shooter may be convicted of multiple counts 
of attempted murder on a “kill zone” theory where the evidence establishes 
that the shooter used lethal force designed and intended to kill everyone in 
an area around the targeted victim as the means of accomplishing the 
killing of that victim.117 
The California Supreme Court held that the facts in Perez do not establish that 
the defendant created a kill zone. Distinguishing the facts of this case from the 
scenarios described at length in Bland, the court held:  
The firing of a single bullet . . . is not the equivalent of using an explosive 
device with intent to kill everyone in the area of the blast, or spraying a 
crowd with automatic weapon fire, a means likewise calculated to kill 
 
108. Id. at 741. 
109. Id.  
110. Id.  
111. Id. at 744. 
112. Id. at 747. 
113. See infra Section II.C. 
114. People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557, 559 (Cal. 2010). 
115. See id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
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everyone fired upon. The indiscriminate firing of a single shot at a group 
of persons, without more, does not amount to attempted murder of 
everyone in the group.118  
In his concurrence, Judge Werdegar noted if the defendant’s marksmanship, 
choice of weapon, and ammunition were such that a single shot would ordinarily 
kill more than two victims, then “a single discharge of a firearm might, in some 
circumstances, support findings the defendant intended to kill multiple victims and 
committed a direct act toward doing so.”119 Even though the court correctly decided 
Perez, Judge Werdegar hinted that it is still possible that circumstantial evidence 
could be used to affirm a kill zone conviction in a case where a single shot was fired.  
4. Key Case: Primary Target 
One of the most important parts of determining whether a defendant created 
a kill zone is whether there was a primary target whom the defendant specifically 
intended to kill. Although it seems that the primary target should be known in order 
to convict on a kill zone case, the court in People v. Stone held otherwise. 
a. People v. Stone 
In Stone, the defendant was convicted of one count of attempted premeditated 
murder for firing a single shot at a group of ten people standing a few feet away 
from his car; no one was injured.120 The information alleged that rival gang member 
Joel F. was the attempted murder victim.121 The court ultimately held the kill zone 
theory did not fit the facts of the case because there was no evidence that Stone 
“used the means to kill the named victim, Joel F., that inevitably would result in the 
death of other victims within a zone of danger.”122 
In dictum, the court addressed whether attempted murder requires the intent 
to kill a particular person.123 The court sought to determine if attempted murder and 
the kill zone theory addresses the question of “whether the intent must be to kill a 
particular person, or whether a generalized intent to kill someone, but not 
necessarily a specific target, is sufficient.”124 To answer this question, the court 
referenced Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v. Scott: “[T]here is no 
requirement of an unlawful intent to kill an intended victim. The law speaks in terms 
of an unlawful intent to kill a person, not the person intended to be killed.”125 Justice 
 
118. Id. at 564–65. Note that here the court is harkening back to the key language from Ford. 
See discussion supra Section I.C.1. 
119. Id. at 567 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
120. See People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272, 274–75 (Cal. 2009). 
121. Id. at 275. 
122. Id. at 277. 
123. Id. (dictum). 
124. Id. at 275. 
125. Id. at 277 (quoting People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 295 (Cal. 1996)); see also JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 133 (4th ed. 2006) (“The social harm of murder is the 
First to Printer_O'Donnell.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/30/20  7:37 AM 
602 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:583 
Mosk’s opinion was also endorsed in Bland, where the court stated, “the intent to 
kill need not be directed at a specific person.”126  
The Stone court concluded that a person could be guilty of attempted murder 
even if that person had no specific target in mind.127 The court cited Bland and Vang 
approvingly, holding “although a primary target often exists and can be identified, 
one is not required.”128 Whether there is a specific target or random target, 
attempted murder must still be judged separately as to each alleged victim.129 The 
court revealed its true intention in coming to this conclusion by stating “[a]n 
indiscriminate would-be killer is just as culpable as one who targets a specific 
person.”130 This strong language illustrates that the Stone court adopted this holding 
to ensure anyone with any intention to kill would not escape culpability, regardless 
of whether or not the case would be more aptly characterized as recklessness.  
While the court correctly upheld Stone’s conviction of one count of attempted 
murder, it extended the parameters of the kill zone theory in holding that evidence 
of a specific target is unnecessary.  
5. Key Cases: Confusing Express and Implied Malice 
As mentioned in Judge Werdegar’s dissent in Smith and concurrence in Perez, 
the kill zone theory presents ample opportunity for jurors, prosecutors, and courts 
to confuse express and implied malice. The following cases exemplify how this 
confusion led to developments in the law that have permitted this confusion  
to continue. 
a. People v. Campos 
In Campos, the defendant shot into a car, killing two people and injuring 
another person.131 Campos’s primary target was Madden, with whom he had an 
ongoing feud.132 While a passenger in his friend’s car, Campos leaned out the 
window and shot into the car Madden was in.133 Madden was in the backseat, and 
his two friends were sitting in the front.134 Both Madden and the driver were killed, 
and the third passenger was severely injured.135 Campos was convicted of two 
counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder.136  
 
killing of a human being by another human being. The requisite intent, therefore, is the intent to kill a, 
not a specific, human being.” (citation omitted)). 
126. Id. (citing People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1114 (Cal. 2002)). 
127. Id. at 278. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. (quoting Bland, 48 P.3d at 1119). 
130. Id.  
131. People v. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 908 (Ct. App. 2007). 
132. See id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 907. 
135. Id. at 908. 
136. Id. at 906. 
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Here, the court noted that Bland did not suggest the kill zone “was the only 
way to establish concurrent intent to kill more than one person in a fired-upon 
group.”137 Again confusing implied and express malice, the court described specific 
intent and the kill zone theory by giving the following example: 
A defendant who shoots into a crowd of people with the desire to kill anyone 
he happens to hit, but not everyone, surely has the specific intent to kill whomever 
he hits, as each person in the group is at risk of death due to the shooter’s 
indifference as to who is his victim.138 
The court ultimately held that the kill zone jury instruction for attempted 
murder was not erroneous.139 
b. People v. Adams 
In Adams, Adams burned down the house of her neighbor, Soult, while Soult 
was inside because Adams was afraid of her.140 Adams was charged and convicted 
of one count of murder, three counts of attempted murder because of the other 
people inside the home when it was set on fire, and one count of arson.141  
Discussing the court’s reasoning in Bland and Smith, the Adams court found 
the means used in a case “distinguishes attempted murder under a concurrent intent 
theory from a ‘normal’ attempted murder.”142 Relying on Smith, the court held that 
specific intent to kill coupled with the knowledge of the presence of other victims 
is generally sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the defendant intended 
to kill the attempted murder victims.143 The court provided clarity about what the 
kill zone theory requires as a doctrine of concurrent intent: 
The concurrent intent theory recognizes that the defendant acted with the 
specific intent to kill anyone in the zone of harm with the objective of 
killing a specific person or persons. The theory imposes attempted murder 
liability where the defendant intentionally created a kill zone in order to ensure the 
defendant’s primary objective of killing a specific person or persons despite the 
recognition, or with acceptance of the fact, that a natural and probable consequence 
of that act would be that anyone within that zone could or would die. Whether or 
not the defendant is aware that the attempted murder victims were within 
the zone of harm is not a defense, as long as the victims actually were 
within the zone of harm.144 
Under these newly defined terms, the court held Adams had the necessary 
express malice for attempted murder under the kill zone theory.145 However, the 
 
137. Id. at 915. 
138. Id. at 916 (emphasis added). 
139. See id. at 917. 
140. See People v. Adams, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915, 919–20 (Ct. App. 2008). 
141. See id. at 916. 
142. Id. at 924. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 924–25 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. at 925. 
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use of the language such as “natural and probable consequence” suggests that yet 
again the court convicted on attempted murder when there was implied malice 
rather than the necessary express malice.  
c. People v. Warner 
In Warner, the defendant took a semiautomatic handgun to a bar, shot it on 
the dance floor, and was subsequently charged with two counts of attempted 
murder and one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm.146 He emptied his 
clip of ten bullets and wounded, but did not kill, his primary target, Smith, and an 
innocent bystander, N.C.147 When the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the 
attempted murder of Smith, the prosecution dismissed the count.148 The jury then 
acquitted Warner on the attempted murder of N.C., which was charged under the 
kill zone theory, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted 
voluntary manslaughter.149  
The California Court of Appeals held the kill zone theory was applicable 
because Warner’s actions “provided facts from which a reasonable jury could infer 
he intended to kill all people on the dance floor, including N.C.”150 The court noted 
that “voluntary manslaughter requires either an intent to kill or a conscious 
disregard for life”151 and that “attempted voluntary manslaughter cannot be 
premised on the theory that the defendant acted with conscious disregard for life 
because it would be based on the ‘internally contradictory premise’ that one can 
intend to commit a reckless killing.”152 The court incorrectly upheld Warner’s 
conviction based on an implied malice theory that “the circumstances of the 
shooting were such that defendant must be charged with knowing that anyone in 
the path of the lethal bullets could die, and knowing that others were in the path of 
the bullets.”153 
Despite the court’s comments about how such a use is prohibited and in favor 
of greater punishment, the court expanded the kill zone theory to apply to 
attempted voluntary manslaughter using what is essentially a theory of recklessness. 
The court noted that the kill zone theory “attempts to describe a level of culpability 
and risk that society is unwilling to tolerate. It describes a type of intent that is ‘a 
kind of knowledge or realization.’”154 As evidenced by this statement, courts 
recognize the gap-filling nature of the kill zone theory and acknowledge that it is 
meant to inflict greater punishment. The court here even uses words like 
 






151. Id. at 814 (quoting People v. Bryant, 301 P.3d 1136, 1142 (Cal. 2013)). 
152. Id. (quoting People v. Gutierrez, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256, 260–61 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
153. Id. at 820. 
154. Id. (quoting Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 417, 421 (1987)). 
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“knowledge” and “realization” to describe a doctrine that theoretically does not 
punish defendants for reckless behavior.155 Even with the benefit of ample case law 
and the realization that implied malice is an unacceptable way to find specific intent, 
the court once again misapplied and dangerously expanded the kill zone theory.  
6. Key Cases: Circumstantial Evidence 
Circumstantial evidence is key to analyzing a kill zone case. The following 
cases exemplify how such an analysis should be conducted in order to ensure the 
correct outcome and provide key revisions to the CALJIC jury instruction to limit 
future misunderstandings. 
a. People v. McCloud 
In McCloud, two defendants, Stringer and McCloud, fired ten shots from a 
semiautomatic handgun at a party where over 400 people were present.156 The 
bullets killed two people and injured a third.157 Both defendants were convicted of 
two counts of second-degree murder, Stringer was convicted of forty-six counts of 
attempted murder, and McCloud was convicted of forty-six counts of assault with 
a firearm.158 The appellate court found that the trial court prejudicially erred in 
providing the jury with a kill zone instruction.159 The court narrowed the 
circumstances in which the kill zone theory can be applied, clarifying that it “does 
not operate as an exception to the mental state requirement for  
attempted murder”: 
The kill zone theory thus does notapply if the evidence shows only that 
the defendant intended to kill a particular targeted individual but attacked 
that individual in a manner that subjected other nearby individuals to a risk 
of fatal injury. Nor does the kill zone theory apply if the evidence merely 
shows, in addition, that the defendant was aware of the lethal risk to the 
nontargeted individuals and did not care whether they were killed in the 
course of the attack on the targeted individual. Rather, the kill zone theory 
applies only if the evidence shows that the defendant tried to kill the 
targeted individual by killing everyone in the area in which the targeted individual 
was located.The defendant in a kill zone case chooses to kill everyonein a 
particular area as a means of killing a targeted individual within that area. 
 
155. Words like “realization” and “knowledge” are words more commonly used to describe 
implied malice: “[I]mplied malice exists when that conduct is deliberately performed by a person who 
has knowledge that the conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for 
life.” 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW  
§ 213 (4th ed. 2020) (emphasis added). 
156. People v. McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 2012). 
157. Id.  
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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In effect, the defendant reasons that he cannot miss his intended target if 
he kills everyonein the area in which the target is located.160 
The court correctly reversed the forty-six counts of attempted murder upon 
finding the record contained no evidence that the defendants intended to kill all 
forty-six people with ten bullets or that they had reason to believe killing so many 
people with ten bullets was even possible given the type of ammunition and  
firearm used.161  
b. People v. Canizales 
Canizales further clarified the understanding of when exactly the kill zone 
theory is appropriately applied. In Canizales, two defendants participated in a  
gang-related shooting and were each convicted of one count of first-degree murder 
and two counts of premeditated attempted murder.162 The court concluded that a 
defendant may be convicted under the kill zone theory only when the jury finds that  
(1) the circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary target, 
including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are such that the 
only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone 
of fatal harm—that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill 
everyone present to ensure the primary target’s death—around the primary 
target; and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the 
primary target was located within that zone of harm. Taken together, such 
evidence will support a finding that the defendant harbored the requisite 
specific intent to kill both the primary target and everyone within the zone 
of fatal harm.163 
The court held that when determining the defendant’s intent to create a zone 
of fatal harm, the jury should consider circumstances of the offense, such as “the 
type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is used), the 
distance between the defendant and the alleged victims, and the proximity of the 
alleged victims to the primary target.”164 Importantly, the court cautioned that “trial 
courts must be extremely careful in deciding when to permit the jury to rely upon 
the kill zone theory.”165 The court encouraged trial courts to “reserve the kill zone 
theory for instances in which there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
find that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to kill (not 
merely endanger or harm) everyone in the zone of fatal harm.”166  
 
160. Id. at 910. 
161. Id. at 911 n.5 (distinguishing the case from Vang, where the court held “[t]he jury drew a 
reasonable inference, in light of the placement of the shots, the number of shots, and the use of  
high-powered, wall-piercing weapons, that defendants harbored a specific intent to kill every living 
being within the residences they shot up,” People v. Vang, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704, 710 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
162. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 693 (Cal. 2019). 
163. Id. at 697. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 690. 
166. Id. at 690–91. 
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Here, the court correctly overturned the attempted murder charges because 
the prosecutor’s definition of the kill zone theory was significantly broader than 
permitted and “essentially equated attempted murder with implied malice 
murder.”167 In its decision, the court sought to clarify when the use of the kill zone 
theory is permissible in order to avoid similar mistakes and juror confusion in future 
cases.168 
Eighteen years of the development of the kill zone doctrine has hardly made 
its application clearer. Although strides have been made to help protect defendants, 
many still remain in prison due to confusion among juries, prosecutors, and courts.  
II. CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS 
The kill zone theory seeks to answer one key question: “Is the intent to murder 
transferred to everyone in proximity to the path of the bullet?”169 In 2002, California 
implemented the kill zone theory to extend liability for attempted murder and to fill 
the doctrinal gap left open by this question.170 Since then, courts have been unclear 
about when it is appropriate to apply the kill zone theory. In describing why 
defendants are guilty, several cases apply the kill zone theory in ways that confuse 
express and implied malice.171 Although the court tried to clarify and refine the 
language of the kill zone jury instructions in cases including McCloud and Canizales, 
the kill zone theory remains ambiguous as to when exactly it can and should be 
applied. Courts contend that the type of weapon and the number of shots fired 
matter in determining the applicability of the kill zone theory yet repeatedly hold 
that a single gunshot is indicative of specific intent to kill multiple people.172 Who 
counts as being within the kill zone is dangerously undefined. An absence of limits 
has resulted in confusion in California courts about which cases are kill zone cases, 
allowing prosecutors to apply the theory to more cases than should be permissible. 
The ambiguity of the kill zone theory as it stands today, despite attempts to clarify 
the doctrine, remains open to abuse and misapplication. 
This Part will begin with a literature review of law review articles that discuss 
the kill zone theory, both on its own and in relation to other doctrines. Next, this 
Part will discuss the ways in which the wording of the kill zone jury instruction 
imposes little limitation on its use. There will then be a discussion about how the 
kill zone theory is redundant in light of other doctrines and potential charges. 
 
167. Id. at 702. 
168. Id. at 690–91 (“As past cases reveal, there is a substantial potential that the kill zone theory 
may be improperly applied . . . . Accordingly, in future cases trial courts should reserve the kill zone 
theory for instances in which there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the only 
reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to kill (not merely to endanger or harm) everyone 
in the zone of fatal harm.”). 
169. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1117 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 1000 
(Md. 1993), overruled in part by Henry v. State, 19 A.3d 944 (Md. 2011)). 
170. See supra Section I.C.1. 
171. See supra Sections I.C.1, I.C.3.a, I.C.5.a.  
172. See supra Sections I.C.3.a, I.C.4.a, I.C.3.b.  
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Finally, this Part will address how prosecutors have misused the kill zone theory to 
convict defendants and impose longer, harsher sentences. 
A. Previous Literature Fails to Understand the Issues Inherent in the Kill Zone Theory 
There has not been much written on the kill zone theory, which is likely 
because the doctrine only exists in a few states and is utilized most prominently in 
California and Maryland.173 Most law review articles that mention the kill zone 
theory only do so in relation to the greater overall discussion on transferred intent. 
As of now, the only law review publication entirely devoted to discussion 
about the application of the kill zone theory is Andrew Garza’s “The Magic Bullet 
in People v. Perez: Charging Attempts Based on Culpability and Deterrence 
Regardless of Apparent Ability.”174 This comment discusses why the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Perez was incorrect and argues that the kill zone theory 
is necessary and yields proportionate punishment.175 Garza argues that “where a 
defendant manifests the requisite intent as to each potential victim, and undertakes 
the ineffectual act necessary for an attempt charge, a count for each theoretical 
victim is proper irrespective of the practicalities of a single shot.”176 Furthermore, 
he argues that concerns about disproportionate punishments under the kill zone 
theory are mitigated by prosecutorial discretion in charging and judicial discretion 
in sentencing.177 Garza maintains that application of the kill zone theory in cases 
where a single shot was fired is necessary because greater culpability will increase 
deterrence and will not lead to disproportionate punishment.178 
Although only one law review comment discusses the kill zone theory at 
length, several articles discuss it in relation to transferred intent. In one such article, 
“With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes 
Transferred Intent and Attempted Murder Law,” the author focuses on several 
different forms of murder liability, analyzing how the dangerousness of the offense 
affects the culpability of the defendant.179 In the article’s discussion of transferred 
intent, the author addresses the kill zone theory, arguing that the doctrine of natural 
and probable consequences should be extended to attempted murder because 
“wanton disregard is the functional equivalent of intent to kill.”180 This article 
 
173. See supra Section I.C.1, for discussion on Bland and Ford, the seminal kill zone cases in 
California and Maryland, respectively. 
174. Andrew P. Garza, Comment, The Magic Bullet in People v. Perez: Charging Attempts 
Based on Culpability and Deterrence Regardless of Apparent Ability, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 931 (2012). 
175. See id. at 931–35. 
176. Id. at 931. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 947–50. 
179. Mitchell Keiter, With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes 
Transferred Intent and Attempted Murder Law, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 261–62 (2004). 
180. Id. at 282–83. 
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encourages courts to extend liability for attempted murder based on the idea that 
“purposeful actors are generally more dangerous than indifferent ones.”181 
“Criminal Liability: Transferred and Concurrent Intent” discusses the “legal 
fictions” of transferred and concurrent intent, which the authors argue “allow 
punishment for criminal culpability when an otherwise guilty party would escape 
punishment for his wrongful actions.”182 The authors describe concurrent intent as 
involving “anticipated results to an intended primary victim, with coexisting anticipated 
results to secondary victims.”183 The authors state that proving the secondary victims 
were in the “killing zone” established by “the wrongdoer’s method of attacking the 
primary victim is circumstantial evidence of the wrongdoer’s concurrent intent to 
harm all the victims.”184 The article ultimately concludes that transferred and 
concurrent intent help preserve equity and fairness and should continue to be used 
so wrongdoers may be properly prosecuted and punished proportionally to  
their intent.185 
The common themes among these articles are that the kill zone theory serves 
two important purposes: holding wrongdoers accountable for their actions and 
ensuring they are punished appropriately. These articles advocate for the idea that 
the kill zone theory is filling a very important gap in criminal law and should 
continue to be used by prosecutors. None of these articles address the shortcomings 
of the kill zone theory or recognize how its use has resulted in prosecutorial 
overreach and unjustifiably long sentences for defendants.  
B. Lack of Limitations 
The doctrinal history of the kill zone theory is not given to the jury, so they 
are left to rely solely on the language of the jury instruction. Because they do not 
have access to the context which gave rise to all of the elements, jurors do not know 
that the kill zone theory was created with the bomb-on-a-plane example in mind. 
This leaves prosecutors with wiggle room to use the jury instruction to secure a 
conviction in cases very distinct from that example. The idea that the language of 
the jury instruction limits how prosecutors may use the kill zone theory is not true; 
rather, there is a severe lack of limitations which allows for the manipulation of 
circumstantial evidence to convict defendants of attempted murder.  
This Section will discuss the role of circumstantial evidence, which allows 
courts to bypass what ought to be limits on other key terms. Terms such as “zone 
of fatal harm” and “primary target” have been manipulated by prosecutors using 
circumstantial evidence and have helped them secure convictions in cases that rely 
on theories of implied malice rather than express malice.  
 
181. Id. at 297. 
182. LeEllen Coacher & Libby Gallo, Note, Criminal Liability: Transferred and Concurrent 
Intent, 44 A.F. L. REV. 227, 228 (1998). 
183. Id. at 234. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 242. 
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1. Circumstantial Evidence 
While the jury instructions do provide factors to look for to determine the 
scope of the zone of fatal harm, the factors actually used in kill zone cases vary so 
greatly that it is unclear what would not count as creating a kill zone. According to 
CALJIC 8.66.1, to determine a perpetrator’s intent to create a zone of fatal harm 
and the scope of said zone, “the jury should consider the circumstances of the 
offense, such as the type of weapon used, [the number of shots fired,] the distance 
between the perpetrator and the alleged victim[s], and the proximity of the alleged 
victim[s] to the primary target[s].”186 
When introducing the concept of the kill zone, Ford provides the examples of 
“an assailant who places a bomb on a commercial airplane,” “automatic weapon 
fire,” and “an explosive device devastating enough to kill everyone in the group.”187 
These are examples of extremely dangerous weapons that were designed with the 
purpose of killing a large group of people. Since it is this language upon which the 
entire kill zone theory is based, one would reasonably infer that the doctrine is only 
meant to apply to cases where the defendant attempts to inflict mass destruction in 
order to ensure their target is killed. 
However, the California courts made clear very early on with Bland and Vang 
that the use of a gun was sufficient to create a zone of fatal harm. In Vang, the 
defendants used an AK series assault rifle (automatic weapon) and a shotgun 
(semiautomatic weapon).188 In Bland, the defendant used a .38-caliber handgun 
(semiautomatic weapon).189 Given the variety of guns used in these cases, future 
courts have never questioned that the use of any type of gun could imply the 
defendant sought to create a kill zone.  
While guns have generally been found to be weapons that can create a kill 
zone, courts have varied on how many shots fired it takes to create a zone of fatal 
harm.190 Ford actually provides guidance on when the use of a gun would implicate 
the kill zone theory:  
When the defendant escalate[s] his mode of attack from a single bullet 
aimed at [the target]’s head to a hail of bullets or an explosive device the 
factfinder can infer that, whether or not the defendant succeeded in killing 
[the target], the defendant concurrently intended to kill everyone in [the 
target]’s immediate vicinity to ensure [the target]’s death.191 
 
186. CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.66.1 (2019) (brackets in original). 
187. Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 1000–01 (Md. 1993), overruled in part by Henry v. State, 19 A.3d 
944 (Md. 2011). 
188. People v. Vang, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704, 706 (Ct. App. 2001). 
189. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Cal. 2002). 
190. See People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 669 (Cal. 2019) (“[T]he number of shots fired, 
although relevant to the inquiry, is not dispositive.”). 
191. Ford, 625 A.2d at 1001. 
First to Printer_O'Donnell.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/30/20  7:37 AM 
2020] KILL ZONE THEORY 611 
Given this explicit language, it is unclear why California courts have held that 
one bullet is enough when Ford noted that the mode of attack would have to be 
escalated from that single shot for the kill zone theory to apply. 
The Smith court held firing a single shot into a car containing two people was 
enough to create a kill zone.192 The holding in Smith suggests a single shot recklessly 
endangering multiple individuals is sufficient to uphold multiple attempted murder 
charges. However, in Stone and Perez, the court held a single shot fired at a group of 
people could only support one count of attempted murder.193 These cases correctly 
apply the express malice standard in holding that a single shot is only indicative of 
a specific intent to kill one person.194 Despite the fact that Ford is explicitly clear on 
this issue, disagreement in case law indicates that a single gunshot would be enough 
to convict someone under the kill zone theory so long as the argument was well 
made. As Judge Werdegar stated in his Perez concurrence, “prosecutors in future 
attempted murder cases can be expected to argue that multiple victims were 
positioned so that a single gunshot could have hit them all, even though evidence 
may be entirely lacking that the defendant’s gunshot was objectively likely, or 
subjectively expected, to hit more than one person.”195  
The next step in the circumstantial evidence inquiry is to look at the proximity 
between the shooter and the potential victims, and the proximity between the 
alleged victims and the target. The standards for the appropriate distance vary 
widely. In creating the zone of fatal harm, courts have generally held that people 
occupying the same space as the primary target (such as a car or house) are 
considered to be within the zone; the exact physical distance between the alleged 
victims and the primary target seems to matter little in these scenarios.196  
However, the distance between the shooter and the car or house does matter. 
In Smith, the court inferred that the defendant was one car length away from the car 
when he shot the gun.197 The court found this distance coupled with the fact that 
the defendant shot into the vehicle directly in line with where the target and her 
baby were both seated were sufficient to support the attempted murder 
convictions.198 In Campos, the defendant fired about a dozen bullets from his truck 
which was “only four or five feet” from the victims’ car.199 In Canizales, firing five 
shots was insufficient to justify two attempted murder charges because the shots 
 
192. People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 739 (Cal. 2005). 
193. People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272, 277 (Cal. 2009); People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557, 559–60  
(Cal. 2010). 
194. But even so, others argue that when a defendant manifests the requisite intent as to each 
potential victim, “a count for each theoretical victim is proper irrespective of the practicalities of a single 
shot.” Garza, supra note 174 at 931. 
195. Perez, 234 P.3d at 567. 
196. The exact distance between the shooters and alleged victims was never discussed. See, e.g., 
Smith, 124 P.3d 730; People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107 (Cal. 2002); People v. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904 
(Ct. App. 2007); People v. Vang, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704 (Ct. App. 2001). 
197. Smith, 124 P.3d at 739. 
198. Id. at 740. 
199. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 916. 
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were fired 100 to 160 feet away from Canizales’s targets.200 In Perez, firing a single 
bullet sixty feet from a car at a group of people who were standing less than fifteen 
feet apart was insufficient to sustain eight counts of attempted murder.201 In 
Rayford, the court held that thirty-three feet is close enough to the potential victims 
to support a conviction under the kill zone theory.202 
These cases leave us with a flawed range which allows a problematic amount 
of discretion to use in analyzing kill zone cases, and grey areas also exist because 
many cases don’t discuss this factor at all. What is supposed to be a  
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is rarely done fully in practice.203  
2. “Primary Target” 
The primary target is the person whom the defendant specifically intends to 
kill.205 However, courts have incorrectly found the primary target to be a victim who 
may have been injured by the shooting.206 Even though it is clear that the primary 
target is supposed to be the person whom the defendant harbored specific intent 
to kill, prosecutors have assigned this role of primary target to whoever is most 
convenient so that their case fits within the definition of the kill zone theory.  
The holding in Stone caused confusion as to when the kill zone theory could 
apply because it held that there does not need to be a specific target in mind. 
Although the court correctly held that the kill zone theory did not apply to the case, 
the discussion about needing only intent to kill a person rather than a specific person 
allowed future prosecutors significant leeway in using the kill zone theory. This has 
allowed prosecutors to use the theory of reckless endangerment, whereby shooting 
into a group of people could be construed as an intent to kill a person based on the 
idea that the shooter would know the action could cause someone to be killed. This 
is exactly what happened in Rayford.  
Rayford and Glass were held responsible for eleven counts of attempted 
murder even though the person whom the evidence suggests was the primary target, 
Perry, was not present. The prosecution did not attempt to argue another person 
was the primary target, yet the decision was still affirmed.207 In its decision, the 
appellate court guessed that in the absence of Perry, the primary target could have 
 
200. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 700 (Cal. 2019). 
201. People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557, 559–60 (Cal. 2010). 
202. See Rayford I, No. B179017, 2006 WL 1990962, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2006) (“The 
manner in which the bullets were fired indicates an intent to harm everyone in the vicinity.”); see also 
Rayford II, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (Ct. App. 2020) (discussing how defendants were thirty-three feet 
from the house, a fact omitted in Rayford I). 
203. See, e.g., Perez, 234 P.3d 557; People v. Warner, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809 (Ct. App.), vacated 
and transferred, 449 P.3d 347 (Cal. 2019); Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904; Rayford I, 2006 WL 1990962. 
204. CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.66.1 (2019). 
205. See Canizales, 442 P.3d at 697–98. 
206. See, e.g., Perez, 234 P.3d 557; Warner, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809; Rayford I, 2006 WL 1990962. 
207. Rayford I, 2006 WL 1990962, at *7. 
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been Sheila, Terry, Donisha, or Shadonna.208 By partaking in this guessing game, the 
court made clear that the prosecution failed to prove there was a primary target 
whom Rayford and Glass specifically intended to kill. The appellate court later 
corrected this error, reversing the attempted murder charges and holding that it was 
unclear from the evidence which of the group in front of the house were the  
primary targets.209  
Unlike the trial court in Rayford, the court in Adams properly identified the 
primary target. In Adams, there was ample evidence that Soult was the primary 
target. The court addressed at length the history of the relationship between Soult 
and Adams and how Soult’s concerning behavior led Adams to fear her.210 Based 
off her testimony about the nature of their relationship and the testimony of people 
who knew them both, it was abundantly clear that Adams set fire to Soult’s house 
to harm her. There was absolutely no question as to who the primary target was, 
and that the target was present.  
The difference between the primary targets in Rayford and Adams highlights 
the confusion about how to determine if there was a kill zone. The intent to kill a 
person rather than a specific person as discussed in Stone could lead to mistakes like 
those made in Rayford where prosecutors are able to get away with designating 
someone as the primary target even though evidence supports that the primary 
target was in fact someone else. Although Glass’s and Rayford’s attempted murder 
charges were eventually overturned, there is no certainty that this outcome would 
occur in similar cases. 
3. “Immediate Vicinity” and “Zone of Fatal Harm” 
“Immediate vicinity of the primary target” is vague, and courts have 
interpreted the term in several different ways over the doctrinal history of the kill 
zone theory. The most recent revision to CALJIC 8.66.1 attempted to narrow the 
meaning of immediate vicinity by calling it the zone of fatal harm, but even that 
wording lacks precision and leaves much to interpretation. It suggests that there 
must have been a real possibility that a person within the immediate vicinity of the 
primary target could have been killed as a result of the defendant trying to kill the 
primary target. Who is within the zone of fatal harm is entirely dependent on 
circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used and the physical distance 
between the perpetrators and potential victims.212 The language of the jury 
instruction makes it clear that in order to create a zone fatal harm, the defendant 
must have used a lethal weapon. 
 
208. Id. at *6. 
209. Rayford II, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 424 (Ct. App. 2020). 
210. People v. Adams, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915, 919–21 (Ct. App. 2008). 
211. CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.66.1 (2019). 
212. Id. 
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Cases such as Bland, Smith, Vang, and Campos have found that shooting at 
someone in a car means that everyone else within the car is in the immediate vicinity 
of the primary target.213 Cases like Adams have found that if the defendant is trying 
to kill someone in a house by setting that house on fire, everyone within the house 
is within the immediate vicinity of the primary target.214 McCloud, Canizales, Stone, 
and Perez all involved shootings at groups of people standing outside, neither in a 
car nor a building. Perhaps coincidentally, the court reversed the holdings in all of 
the shootings that did not take place in a car or building. Stone and Perez were 
reversed primarily because the defendant in each case only fired a single shot, and 
that single shot could not justify the use of the kill zone theory because it was 
indicative of attempt to murder only one person.215 But the fact that shootings took 
place in a large area where several people were gathered was a substantial part of 
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in McCloud and Canizales.216 
4. Express and Implied Malice 
Courts have confused express and implied malice since the inception of the 
kill zone theory. The inevitable conclusion of using implied malice to convict 
defendants of attempted murder is that reckless behavior gets punished like 
intentional misconduct. In particular, the courts in Campos and Smith both confused 
implied and express malice to come to their conclusions. In Smith, the court 
frequently used language indicating there was a risk that people within the zone of 
fatal harm would be killed but failed to make the important distinction that the 
defendant must have intended for it to be the case that everyone in the zone died in 
order to kill the primary target.218 Misspeaking in this way permits defendants to be 
found guilty under a theory of implied malice and wanton recklessness despite the 
fact that this is prohibited for attempted murder charges and inconsistent with the 
rationale of kill zone law.  
In Campos, the court’s description of proper use of the kill zone theory 
provides a clear indication of the blurred line between express and implied malice:  
A defendant who shoots into a crowd of people with the desire to kill anyone 
he happens to hit, but not everyone, surely has the specific intent to kill whomever 
he hits, as each person in the group is at risk of death due to the shooter’s 
indifference as to who is his victim.219 
 
213. See supra Sections I.C.1, I.C.2, I.C.3.a, I.C.5.a.  
214. See supra Section I.C.5.b. 
215. People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557, 563–65 (Cal. 2010); People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272, 276–77 
(Cal. 2009).
216. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 700 (Cal. 2019); People v. McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
902, 912–13 (Ct. App. 2012). 
217. See supra Section II.B. 
218. People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 736 (Cal. 2005). 
219. People v. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 916 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). 
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The italicized phrases include language which mirrors implied malice; the 
court describes nothing more than a conscious disregard for human life. Because of 
this deeply flawed understanding, the court upheld the defendant’s attempted 
murder conviction. 
In Warner, the court took an extra step by extending the kill zone theory to 
voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is defined as “the unlawful killing 
of a human being without malice . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”220 
While voluntary manslaughter does contain an element of specific intent to kill, it 
does not contain the same malice component that attempted murder does.221 
Furthermore, the provoker must be the target of an attempted murder charge for 
voluntary manslaughter to be appropriate. Here, the kill zone theory was used to 
charge attempted voluntary manslaughter when the target was not the person who 
provoked the defendant.222 The prosecutor used the kill zone theory to convict 
Warner on an additional charge and ensure the defendant was punished for the 
reckless shooting.223 
In cases like Smith, Campos, and Warner, the courts ignored the two-step test 
articulated in CALJIC 8.66.1224 and upheld convictions based on reckless or 
dangerous behavior that did not indicate a desire to kill a specific target nor anyone 
near that target. While courts have tried to narrow the language to clarify what is 
necessary for a jury to find that the defendant indeed intended to and did create a 
kill zone, there remains a lack of limits regarding what the courts find to  
be permissible. 
C. Redundancy 
Although transferred intent and wanton recklessness cannot be substitutes for 
the kill zone theory, the doctrine of conditional intent, assessing specific attempt as 
to each victim, and adding charges other than attempted murder could fill the 
doctrinal gap articulated in Bland. Because these three suggested substitutes capture 
the spirit of the kill zone theory, there is no actual need for the kill zone theory. 
Using the language of conditional intent could help clarify what jurors should 
look for in kill zone cases. Conditional intent lines up well with the  
bomb-on-a-plane example given in Ford and would likely result in less 
misapplication of the kill zone theory. The entire point of the kill zone theory is that 
 
220. 1 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 155, § 224. 
221. “Murder generally requires an intent to kill; manslaughter does not. Manslaughter is, 
instead, ‘the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.’” Id. § 226 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE  
§ 192 (West 2015). 
222. People v. Warner, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809, 811 (Ct. App.), vacated and transferred, 449 P.3d 347 
(Cal. 2019). 
223. Id. 
224. For the kill zone theory to apply, the evidence must show: “1. The perpetrator intended to 
create a [zone of fatal harm] [kill zone] around the primary target; . . . and 2. The alleged attempted 
murder victim[s] who [was] [were] not the primary target[s] [was] [were] located within the [zone of 
fatal harm.] [kill zone.]” CALJIC, supra note 20, § 8.66.1 (2019). 
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the defendant specifically intended to kill everyone in proximity to the primary target in 
order to kill the primary target. Like conditional intent, this indicates that “death is 
more than merely foreseeable” and is part of a deliberate plan to kill if necessary.225 
The standard for carjacking cases, if used to limit the kill zone theory, would aid to 
eliminate any confusion about the mental state for attempted murder under the kill 
zone theory. Adapting the federal carjacking statute language to the kill zone theory, 
the intent requirement would be that when the defendant attempted to kill the 
primary target, he or she possessed the conditional intent to seriously harm or kill 
the individuals around the primary target if necessary to ensure the death of the 
primary target. This line of thinking is much more in line with the purpose for the 
kill zone theory as outlined in Ford.226 The language of conditional intent could be 
most applicable in cases where someone was actually killed. For example, if 
someone threw a grenade and four people were killed, a court might properly 
conclude there was an attempt to murder the twelve people in the surrounding area 
because death for those nearby was “more than merely foreseeable.” Although 
conditional intent captures the spirit of the kill zone theory and would provide a 
clearer standard for assessing liability, proponents of the kill zone theory may be 
reluctant to adopt it because it would be more difficult to prove and could result in 
fewer attempted murder cases and thus less punishment.  
Although the law review articles discussed above would lead one to believe 
that the kill zone theory is absolutely necessary to ensure defendants do not escape 
appropriate punishment, they fail to recognize that simply going through the steps 
of finding specific intent for each potential victim is the fairest way to determine 
whether the defendant should be charged with attempted murder. Since Bland 
brought the kill zone theory to California, courts have consistently reiterated that 
“[t]o be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged 
victim, not someone else. The defendant’s mental state must be examined as to each 
alleged attempted murder victim.”227 Because the kill zone theory fails to examine 
intent with regard to each victim, it appears to exist for no other reason than to 
increase punishments. It would be more effective if jurors simply examined whether 
the defendant specifically intended to kill each alleged victim.  
Additionally, there are other charges prosecutors could add that would capture 
the endangerment that courts are concerned about more appropriately than 
attempted murder charges. In cases like Bland, Campos, Canizales, and Smith where 
the shooter either shot at a house or car, the prosecutor could have added a shooting 
at an inhabited dwelling or shooting at an occupied motor vehicle charge.228 This 
charge is a wobbler, meaning it could either be charged as a misdemeanor or a 
felony. If charged as a felony, the punishment would be “imprisonment in the state 
 
225. The Supreme Court, 1998 Term–Leading Cases, supra note 52, at 380. 
226. See Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 1000–01 (Md. 1993), overruled in part by Henry v. State, 19 
A.3d 944 (Md. 2011). 
227. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1117 (Cal. 2002). 
228. CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 1988). 
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prison for three, five, or seven years.”229 If the prosecutor did not have the evidence 
to secure an attempted murder conviction, there is still a possibility that the 
defendant could go to prison for an additional three to seven years, which is still a 
significant amount of time and more consistent with the legislative intent of such 
endangerment charges. If convicted of these other charges, there is no way a 
prosecutor could argue the defendants were evading punishment. 
D. Prosecutorial Overreach 
Prosecutors trying to lock away known gang members for as long as possible 
have the kill zone theory at their disposal whenever a shooting at a group is involved. 
In cases like Canizales and McCloud, use of the kill zone theory led to life 
sentences.230 Many defendants suffer life-altering consequences from prosecutors 
using the kill zone theory merely to get harsher sentences.  
Prosecutors can take advantage of the malleable language of the kill zone jury 
instruction and fit it to the facts of their case. Most often, prosecutors use the kill 
zone theory to add on more charges and secure longer sentences for defendants. 
Prosecutors tend to use the kill zone theory when their arguments for proving 
specific intent for the attempted murder of each alleged victim are weak. The kill 
zone theory allows prosecutors to assert that a much wider range of people were 
targeted by the defendant. Because the language of the kill zone theory jury 
instruction imposes few limitations, prosecutors have the freedom to make the kill 
zone theory work for them and can make facts in varying scenarios fit  
the definition.  
The easiest way to get this point across is by arguing that there was some kind 
of gang warfare occurring. Bland and its discussion of Vang set a precedent for using 
the kill zone theory on gang-related shootings.231 The kill zone theory lends itself 
well to gang cases based on the idea that gangs most often shoot at other gangs. If 
gang member A intends to kill rival gang member B, and rival gang members C and 
D are in the vicinity of gang member B, it is easy to make the assumption that gang 
member A would have been fine with killing rival gang members C and D if it 
meant they would successfully kill gang member B. Even jurors who know very little 
about the realities of gang violence likely know that the Bloods hate the Crips and 
could make the inference that animosity between gangs means gang member A is 
willing to kill rival gang members B, C, and D. Invoking gang membership makes 
the kill zone theory more plausible to a jury and draws on the belief that gang 
members are indiscriminate killers. As such, it is no coincidence that most kill zone 
 
229. Id. 
230. People v. Canizales, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 626 (Ct. App.), review pending, 326 P.3d 977  
(Cal. 2014); People v. McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 905 (Ct. App. 2012) 
231. Bland, 48 P.3d at 1118–19. 
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cases involve gang activity. Of the cases discussed in this Note alone, the majority 
focus on gang activity to some extent.232 
Evidence of gang membership is highly prejudicial and “creates a risk the jury 
will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal disposition and is therefore guilty 
of the offense charged.”233 Even where gang membership is relevant (if gang 
evidence is relevant to intent, motive, or identity, for example), there is still a 
significant risk that any mention of gang involvement will prejudice the jury and 
increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict.234 Because law enforcement officials are 
often called to testify as to who is in a gang, “[i]t is difficult to know to what extent 
gang affiliation results from police attribution and how much from actual individual 
behavior,” particularly in cases where law enforcement officials use race as a 
defining characteristic of gang membership.235 When race is used to profile a gang 
member, “it is hardly surprising that law enforcement focused on gang members 
results in the prosecution of disproportionately high numbers of those whose race 
is used to define the category.”236 
In Rayford, the prosecutor’s argument conveyed to the jury that the argument 
between Glass and Perry was gang related.237 The prosecution heavily relied on 
evidence that Glass and Rayford, two Black teenagers, were in a gang to secure their 
attempted murder convictions.238 A detective testified that Glass and Rayford were 
in a gang simply upon his general knowledge of gangs, without any substantial 
evidence outside that of the charged offenses.239 The appellate court reversed the 
gang enhancements, ruling there was insufficient evidence that Glass and Rayford 
were gang members.240 Because the prosecutor’s entire theory was that Rayford and 
Glass specifically intended to kill someone due to a gang-related dispute, the 
requisite intent falls apart when the court concludes that they were not gang 
members.241 The prosecution wrongly relied on the idea that the two boys were 
 
232. See generally People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686 (Cal. 2019); People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557 
(Cal. 2010); Bland, 48 P.3d 1107; People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272 (Cal. 2009); McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
902; People v. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904 (Ct. App. 2007); Rayford I, No. B179017, 2006 WL 1990962 
(Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2006). 
233. 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Trial § 525 (2020); see also People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710 
(Cal. 1997). 
234. See Mitchell Eisen, Brenna Dotson & Gregory Dohi, Probative or Prejudicial: Can Gang 
Evidence Trump Reasonable Doubt?, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 14–15 (2014) (discussing the 
results of a study which found jurors are more likely to vote guilty in cases where gang evidence  
is presented). 
235. Donna Coker, Forward: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice 
System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 854 (2003). 
236. Id. at 855. 
237. See Rayford I, No. B179017, 2006 WL 1990962, at *3–4, *9–11 (Cal. Ct. App. July  
18, 2006). 
238. Id. at *3. 
239. Id. at *10. 
240. Id. at *9. 
241. See id. at *3–4, *9–11. 
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gang members and leaned on the detective’s testimony to convince the jury that the 
kill zone theory applied in this case.  
The prosecutor in Canizales also used gang-related evidence to secure 
convictions. Here, the prosecutor used the same argument that because the 
individuals were rival gang members, there was a motive for the shooting because 
the defendants were “trying to kill Hustla Squad.”242 The court found that the jury 
questions and prosecutor’s closing argument suggested that in relying on the kill 
zone theory, “the jury found that defendants created a zone of fatal harm in which 
they intended all persons would be killed for the benefit of the gang.”243 Evidently, 
using the kill zone theory and relying on gang-related evidence communicates to the 
jury that specific intent to kill one gang member extends to specific intent to kill all 
members of that rival gang. 
In relying on gang evidence to secure higher conviction rates and longer 
sentences, prosecutors exploit the confusing language of the kill zone jury 
instruction. It is easy to prey upon juror confusion and false assumptions about 
gang members in these cases to make it so the defendant can be convicted of 
attempted murder despite weak evidence of requisite specific intent. People of color 
face a particular danger in this practice, as they are more likely to be arbitrarily 
labeled as gang members.244 Although the courts believe it to fill a doctrinal gap, 
the kill zone theory functions more as a tool to secure convictions when evidence 
is lacking. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
There is no reason for the kill zone theory to exist. Consider once again the 
bomb-on-a-plane example from Ford: if an assailant places a bomb on a commercial 
airplane, there is obvious intent to kill every person on board in order to kill the 
primary target. Even if the bomb did not go off, a reasonable jury could apply the 
attempted murder statute to find that specific intent existed to kill each person on 
the plane; the kill zone theory is not necessary for a jury to come to this conclusion. 
Likewise, the application of the attempted murder statute to the example in Ford 
where the assailant fired a hail of bullets at two people in order to kill the primary 
target would yield the same result. Neither scenario actually requires the use of the 
kill zone theory to get to the outcome desired by the court. The Bland court was 
wrong; there was no doctrinal gap the kill zone theory needed to fill. Bland simply 
eased the path to conviction. 
To avoid the issues posed by the kill zone theory, I propose three solutions, 
all of which require the abolition of the kill zone theory jury instruction: 
1. Analyze specific intent as to each person who was within the zone of 
fatal harm; 
 
242. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 704 (Cal. 2019). 
243. Id. at 705. 
244. Coker, supra note 235, at 854–55.  
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2. Apply the doctrine of conditional intent to attempted murder cases 
involving groups of people; and/or 
3. Replace attempted murder with lesser charges to ensure that defendants 
do not completely escape liability for reckless behavior. 
The formula for finding specific intent in an attempted murder case is so 
simple that surely a jury would see through any prosecutor’s twisting of the 
narrative. Although slightly more time consuming, forcing a prosecutor to go 
through the steps of proving specific intent to kill each person would certainly result 
in fewer attempted murder charges, fewer attempted murder convictions on scant 
evidence, and fewer lengthy sentences for defendants. 
Prosecuting attempted murder in a kill zone case using conditional intent 
would require a greater showing of evidence that there was a deliberate and willful 
plan to kill everyone in the vicinity of the primary target if doing so was necessary 
to ensure the primary target was killed. Prosecutors would certainly have a more 
difficult time proving their case under this theory. However, this is not a 
recommendation that the legislature incorporate the key language from the federal 
carjacking statute to the kill zone jury instruction. A new statute or another 
amendment to the language of the jury instruction would do no good because Bland 
fundamentally misunderstood the need for the kill zone theory in the first place. 
This is merely to say that using the language of the doctrine of conditional intent 
could heighten the burden of proof for attempted murder in a case where the kill 
zone theory would have previously applied. 
Charging the defendant with lower-level crimes would solve the issue of 
avoiding culpability that Bland was so concerned about. By replacing attempted 
murder with charges that would still result in felony convictions and prison time, 
judges could ensure that defendants would not be getting away with dangerous and 
reckless behavior. A felony conviction of any sort has substantial consequences, and 
prison time of any length is still significant punishment. While convictions on such 
charges may fall short of the punishment prosecutors or courts would prefer, the 
charges would better reflect the culpability for recklessness that the  
legislature intended. 
To demonstrate the efficacy of these proposed solutions, this Part will use 
tables to illustrate how each previously discussed case could have come out 
differently if the court had analyzed specific intent for attempted murder as to each 
person, analyzed whether there was a deliberate or willful plan to kill everyone in 
the vicinity of the primary target, and replaced attempted murder with lesser 
charges. This Part will then illustrate how such changes would have affected the 
number of years each defendant received. Overall, this analysis will demonstrate 
that the kill zone theory is not necessary and that there are more just options for 
courts to take advantage of. 
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A. Table 1: Different Methods of Analysis 
The table below lists each case and how the outcomes would differ if the court 
(1) analyzed specific intent for each potential victim, (2) utilized the deliberate and 
willful plan language from the federal carjacking statute, and (3) replaced attempted 
murder with lesser charges. 
Table 1. Different methods of analysis 
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245. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Cal. 2002). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 1119. 
249. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(2) (West 2012) (“Any person who commits an assault upon 
the person of another with a firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, 
three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than six months and not exceeding one year . . . .”). 
250. CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 1988) (“Any person who shall maliciously and willfully 
discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, [or] occupied motor vehicle . . . is 
guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, 
five, or seven years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not less than six months and 
not exceeding one year.”). 
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251. People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 733 (Cal. 2005). 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 747. 
254. PENAL § 245. 
255. PENAL § 246.  
256. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(a) (West 1997) (“Any person who, under circumstances or 
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, 
or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering . . . shall be punished by imprisonment 
in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for two, four, or six years.”). 
First to Printer_O'Donnell.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/30/20  7:37 AM 











 !+../8 2+. + :;39; .3<:>=/ @3=2
+7:9<@+<23=,B<3A,>66/=<+8.
@+< 38 =2/:+<</81/; <3./,+-5</+=
90 =2/ -+; @2/;/ +7:9< @+<
+37381
9></ .;3?/; 90 -+; <29= 38 =2/
2/+.69@/;,+-5+8.;312=+;7	




!+../8 @+< =2/ 38=/8./. =+;1/=
6+-590/?3./8-/38.3-+=381+7:9<
<:/-303-+66B 38=/8./. =9 5366 9></
+8.%9.;31>/C
"9 /?3./8-/ 90 + ./63,/;+=/
:6+8=95366+8B98/,>=!+../8






















 &9>6= 2+. ,//8 2+;+<<381 .+7<
+8. <+B381 ;>./ =2381< =9 2/;
,/-+></ .+7< <=96/ 2/;
,9B0;3/8.
#=2/; =2;// :/9:6/ 38 =2/ 29></




=+;1/=  +-5 90 /?3./8-/ 38.3-+=381
.+7<<:/-303-+66B 38=/8./. =95366
+8B98/,>=&9>6=
"9 /?3./8-/ 90 + ./63,/;+=/
:6+8=95366+8B98/,>=&9>6==
@+< 09;/<//+,6/ =2+= </==381 +





257. People v. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 907–08 (Ct. App. 2007). 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 2012). 
261. CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 1988). 
262. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26100(c) (West 2012) (“Any person who willfully and maliciously 
discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person other than an occupant of a motor vehicle 
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison for three, five, or seven years.”). 
263. People v. Adams, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915, 920–22 (Ct. App. 2008). 
264. Id. at 922. 
265. Id. at 924–25. 
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266. People v. Stone, 205 P.3d 272, 274 (Cal. 2009).  
267. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 2012). 
268. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26100 (West 2012). 
269. People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557, 559 (Cal. 2010). 
270. Id. 
271. People v. McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 916 (Ct. App. 2012). 
272. CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 1988).  
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273. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 691 (Cal. 2019). 
274. Id. at 692. 
275. Id. at 691. 
276. Id. at 692. 
277. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 2012). 
278. People v. Warner, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809, 811 (Ct. App.), vacated and transferred, 449 P.3d 347 
(Cal. 2019). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 812.  
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B. Table 2: Sentencing 
The following table lists (1) the original sentence for each defendant in each 
case, (2) what the sentence would be without extra attempted murder charges, and 
(3) what the sentence would be without extra attempted murder charges and with 
the proposed lesser charges from Table 1.  
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281. Rayford I, No. B179017, 2006 WL 1990962, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2006). 
282. See id. 
283. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 2012). 
284. CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 1988). 
285. People v. Bland, No. B140775, 2002 WL 31769369, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002). 
286. Smith was sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison for the attempted murder of Karen 
to be served concurrently with an identical term for the attempted murder of the baby; the court stayed 
sentencing on shooting at an occupied vehicle, child endangerment, and assault with a firearm pursuant 
to section 654 of the California Penal Code. People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 734 (Cal. 2005). 
287. People v. Campos, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 906 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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288. Adams was charged with one count of first-degree murder, one count of arson, and three 
counts of attempted murder. She was sentenced to four terms of life without the possibility of parole 
for the murder and the three attempted murder charges, to run concurrently. People v. Adams, 86  
Cal. Rptr. 3d 915, 916–17 (Ct. App. 2008). 
289. Stone was charged with one count of attempted murder with gang and firearm 
enhancements and sentenced to an indeterminate term of fifteen years to life; plus a determinate term 
of ten years on the attempted murder conviction, with gang and firearm enhancements; and three to 
seven consecutive years to life terms on convictions for attempting to dissuade witnesses, with a gang 
enhancement. People v. Stone, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 180, 181 (Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 205 P.3d 272 (Cal. 2009). 
290. The attempted murder charge in this case was proper. Additional charges are listed to 
demonstrate how much of a difference lesser recklessness charges can make in sentencing. 
291. People v. Perez, 234 P.3d 557, 560 (Cal. 2010) (“Defendant was sentenced on one count 
of premeditated attempted murder . . . to [fifteen] years to life, plus an enhancement of [twenty-five] 
years to life for personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. Sentences on the remaining 
attempted murder convictions were imposed to run concurrently, and sentences on the convictions of 
assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer, as well as all remaining firearm use 
enhancements, were imposed but stayed pursuant to section 654, for an aggregate prison term of [forty] 
years to life.”). 
292. Because several charges were stayed, the sentence would have remained the same, but he 
would have been convicted of only one count of attempted murder instead of eight. 
293. Sentences were calculated as if charges ran consecutively rather than concurrently. 
294. McCloud was originally sentenced to 202 years to life in state prison: fifteen years to life 
for the first count of second-degree murder plus twenty-five to life for the firearm allegations, an 
identical sentence for the second count of second-degree murder, seventeen years for the attempted 
murder of Ryan Gaines, and “one-third of the midterm of three years, plus [sixteen] months for the 
personal use of a firearm allegation . . . as to each of the remaining [forty-five] counts, with all sentences 
to run consecutively.” People v. McCloud, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 905–06 (Ct. App. 2012). 
295. Stringer was originally sentenced to 198 years to life in state prison: fifteen years to life for 
the first count of second-degree murder plus three years for the principal armed allegation; an identical 
sentence for the second count of second-degree murder; twelve years for the attempted murder of Ryan 
Gaines; and “[twenty-eight] months . . . plus [twelve] months for the principal armed allegation, for 
each of the remaining [forty-five] counts, with all sentences to run consecutively.” Id. 
296. Windfield and Canizales were found guilty of the first-degree murder of Cooksey, who 
was in the vicinity of Pride and Bolden during the shooting, and were also found guilty of the attempted 
murders of Bolden and Pride. All charges were found to be committed for the benefit of a criminal 
street gang. People v. Canizales, 442 P.3d 686, 693 (Cal. 2019). Originally, Canizales was sentenced to 
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* Case analyzed as if some charges were not stayed. 
 Case analyzed as if the lesser charges were not stayed and other attempted murder charges did not  
run concurrently. 
Tables 1 and 2 work together to show just how drastically defendants’ 
sentences would change as a result of eliminating attempted murder charges that 
cannot stand alone without the kill zone theory. Analyzing specific intent to each 
individual and applying a “deliberate and willful plan” standard in Table 1 reveals 
that in most cases, there was only one person the defendant specifically intended to 
kill and others nearby were close enough to the primary target that death or injury 
would be merely foreseeable.301 Although courts may be concerned that this 
proposed way of analyzing kill zone cases would not confer adequate punishment, 
the recalculated sentences with lesser charges in Table 2 demonstrate that 
defendants would not evade punishment for their reckless behavior. 
 
twenty-five years to life and two terms of fifteen years to life. People v. Canizales, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
625, 626 (Ct. App.), review pending, 326 P.3d 977 (Cal. 2014). 
297. “Windfield was sentenced to two terms of [twenty-five] years to life and two terms of 
[fifteen] years to life plus [forty] years.” Canizales, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 626. 
298. Warner was originally sentenced to twenty-two years in prison, calculated as follows: “nine 
years (upper term) for the assault, plus [ten] years for personal use of a firearm pursuant to Penal Code 
section 12022.5 subdivision (a), plus three consecutive years for the personal infliction of great bodily 
injury[,] [and][t]he trial court stayed the attempted voluntary manslaughter sentence of five years six 
months pursuant to Penal Code section 654.” People v. Warner, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809, 811 (Ct. App.), 
vacated and transferred, 449 P.3d 347 (Cal. 2019). 
299. Rayford and Glass were found guilty of eleven counts of attempted murder with gang and 
firearm enhancements, and one count of shooting at an inhabited building. Both were sentenced to 
eleven life sentences for the attempted murders plus 220 years on the enhancements. The enhancements 
were set aside on appeal and both defendants’ sentences were reduced to eleven consecutive life 
sentences. Rayford I, No. B179017, 2006 WL 1990962, at *1, *12 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2006). 
300. Id. 
301. See generally supra Table 1. 
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C. Counterarguments 
Those who oppose abolishing the kill zone theory claim doing so would 
unfairly decrease punishment and deterrence. In his comment condemning the 
court’s decision in Perez, Andrew Garza claims prosecutorial and judicial discretion 
mitigate any concerns about disproportionate punishment.302 In their respective 
articles discussing the kill zone theory, Mitchell Keiter and Lt. Col. LeEllen Coacher 
and Captain Libby Gallo agree that the extension of liability in kill zone theory cases 
is warranted to deter crime and ensure that individuals are adequately punished.303 
However, reckless conduct of defendants has been misclassified as intent to kill 
using the kill zone theory. As previously demonstrated, the addition of lesser 
charges could mitigate escaping punishment. In many cases, these lesser charges 
were intended by the legislature to ensure people did not escape punishment for 
acting recklessly and endangering of others. These authors and those who share 
their opinions fail to recognize that punishment should fit the crime rather than 
allowing any one judge to create law based on their individual moral compass. 
In some cases, the elimination of attempted murder charges based on the kill 
zone theory would result in no substantial difference in punishment. Because of 
other justifiable murder and attempted murder charges, and gang and firearm 
enhancements, the elimination of certain attempted murder charges in cases 
including Bland, Campos, Adams, McCloud, and Canizales (with respect to defendant 
Windfield) would have lessened the minimum sentence, but still would have 
resulted to life imprisonment for the defendants.304 Even still, the fact that the 
minimum sentences in some of these cases would have been lessened is significant 
and reveals a deeper issue of oversentencing in kill zone cases. The sentences in 
Bland, Adams, and McCloud would have been lessened by over 100 years without 
superfluous kill zone charges. While it may not have mattered in these cases, such a 
drastic change could make a significant difference to other defendants and could 
mean the difference between life in prison and the opportunity to have a life  
after prison.305 
Because of stayed and concurrent sentences in Smith, Perez, and Warner, any 
elimination of attempted murder charges would have resulted in no change in 
sentence.306 However, when you look at how the sentences in these three cases 
would have changed when calculated without stayed charges and concurrent 
sentences, it is evident how much of a difference the elimination of additional 
attempted murder charges would make. Considering that not every court is going 
to run attempted murder charges concurrently or stay lesser charges in a kill zone 
 
302. Garza, supra note 174, at 931. 
303. Keiter, supra note 179, at 297; Coacher & Gallo, supra note 182, at 242. 
304. See generally supra Table 2. 
305. Id.  
306. Id. 
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case, it is important to examine how these cases could have come out with a 
different judge.  
In Canizales (with respect to defendant Canizales) and Rayford, the defendants 
would have received shorter sentences due to the elimination of superfluous 
attempted murder charges. When Canizales’s attempted murder charges were 
reversed, he was resentenced to twenty-five years to life.307 Adding time for the 
lesser charge of assault with a firearm would result in a sentence of twenty-seven to 
twenty-nine years to life. Similarly, if attempted murder charges were removed and 
replaced by lesser charges, Glass and Rayford would have been sentenced to seven 
to fifteen years in prison.308 The argument that these defendants would escape 
punishment without the additional attempted murder charges is simply unfounded. 
While it is true that their sentences would be shorter, they would still serve 
substantial time for their reckless behavior. In fact, these shorter sentences better 
reflect the legislature’s intent because these statutes were created for the purpose of 
punishing reckless and dangerous behavior. Lesser charges such as shooting at an 
occupied dwelling and assault with a firearm are intended to punish people for 
reckless behavior; attempted murder is a specific intent crime and is not intended 
to punish people for reckless behavior.309 
The reality is that charging lesser offenses instead of attempted murder better 
reflects what the legislature considers to be adequate punishment. The kill zone 
theory is simply not needed to ensure that defendants are held culpable and 
punished fairly.  
CONCLUSION 
The kill zone theory is not necessary; it does nothing more than authorize 
conviction on attempted murder for situations which involved no more than 
wanton recklessness. The Bland court’s desire to keep people who are lousy shots 
from escaping liability for endangering the lives of others makes it clear that the kill 
zone theory was not meant to fill a doctrinal gap but merely to increase punishment 
and secure convictions on weaker evidence. The use of the kill zone theory is 
 
307. Id. 
308. Id. On June 16, 2020, Glass’s and Rayford’s attempted murder sentences were vacated on 
appeal. See Rayford II, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 424 n.22 (Ct. App. 2020). After months of waiting to be 
resentenced on the lesser included charge, Glass and Rayford were finally released from prison on 
October 30, 2020. On November 13, 2020, they were resentenced to seven years—the maximum felony 
sentence—for the shooting at an inhabited dwelling charge. They received time served for the remaining 
felony charge and do not have to do parole because of their prolonged imprisonment. Glass and 
Rayford continue to assert their innocence and seek complete exoneration on the remaining charge. 
For more information on Glass’s and Rayford’s innocence, see James Queally, Two Black Men Sentenced 
to Life as Teens to be Freed. But Should L.A. County D.A. Have Reviewed Convictions Earlier?,  
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-22/
rayford-glass-convictions-overturned [https://web.archive.org/web/20201107070600/https:// 
www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-22/rayford-glass-convictions-overturned ]. 
309. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1116 (Cal. 2002); LEVENSON & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 
42; 40 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 47. 
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particularly concerning because it allows substantial leeway for prosecutors to tailor 
their case to fit the theory. The kill zone theory encourages the jury to consider 
circumstantial evidence and make inferences about what the defendants did or did 
not specifically intend, allowing prosecutors the opportunity to twist the narrative 
to lead the jury to convict. Perhaps the court adopted the kill zone theory because 
they wanted prosecutors to have the ability to punish defendants for attempted 
murder under a lower burden of proof than attempted murder actually permits. But 
in easing prosecutors’ path to conviction, courts have weakened protections against 
meritless attempted murder charges and endlessly long sentences.  
In order to ensure defendants are held responsible for attempted murder, one 
only needs to assess specific intent as to each person and whether there was a 
deliberate and willful plan to kill several people in order to determine whether an 
attempted murder charge is truly necessary. If the attempted murder charge is not 
justified, lesser charges should be added to ensure that the defendant does not 
escape punishment for their reckless behavior.  
The only just solution is to abolish the use of the kill zone theory in California 
and reevaluate the cases of those who have been convicted on the basis of this 
flawed doctrine. 
  
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